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This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter 
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is 
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s 
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will 
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that 
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the 
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women 
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no 
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second 
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as 
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the 
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to 
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal 
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s 
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the 
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit 
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This 
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good 
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize 
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to 
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally, 
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his 
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than 
appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
Table of Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………...4
Chapter 1……………………………………………………………6
1.1…………………………………………………………...7
1.2…………………………………………………………...16
1.3…………………………………………………………...20
1.4…………………………………………………………...34
1.5…………………………………………………………...36
1.6…………………………………………………………...41
Chapter 2……………………………………………………………42
2.1……………………………………………………………46
2.2……………………………………………………………51
2.3……………………………………………………………56
2.4……………………………………………………………58
2.5……………………………………………………………66
2.6……………………………………………………………70
Chapter 3……………………………………………………………72
3.1…………………………………………………………...76
3.2…………………………………………………………...84
3.3…………………………………………………………...89
3.4…………………………………………………………...96
3.5…………………………………………………………...102
3.6…………………………………………………………...110
Chapter 4……………………………………………………………112
4.1…………………………………………………………...119
4.2…………………………………………………………...125
4.3…………………………………………………………...132
4.4…………………………………………………………...138
4.5…………………………………………………………...144
 
Conclusion………………………………………………………….146
Bibliography………………………………………………………...148
 
3
 
  
 
 
 
 
Introduction
 
 
 
Modern scholars claim to have investigated Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s views on women, but surprisingly few have actually done so 
and those that have tend to have done so poorly. I believe there are 
two main reasons for this: 1) philosophers place too much importance 
on whether Plato or Aristotle can be considered feminists, and 2) 
philosophers who approach classical texts with an interest in women 
appear to do so with preconceptions and anger. First, trying to 
determine Plato’s or Aristotle’s feminist leanings makes little sense. 
Before one can agree or disagree with women’s rights one must have 
a conception of what a right is; as Plato and Aristotle had no such 
conception, attempting to put their ancient views into modern 
4
 
terminology is pointless. When Plato and Aristotle are analyzed in 
terms of feminism both fare badly, but such criticism is unfair; we are 
judging them by criteria that did not exist in their time. Second, many 
seem to read Plato and Aristotle with a preformed agenda that both 
have only negative views of women and fail to pay attention to what is 
actually stated. A careful examination of Plato’s and Aristotle’s work, 
however, proves that both philosophers held nuanced views of 
women’s natures and capacities, and this dissertation aims to do 
exactly that: carefully analyze what Plato and Aristotle actually wrote 
and how this fits into their larger theories and the society they lived in.
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Chapter One
 
 
 
 
The most appropriate place to begin investigating the role of 
women in Plato’s ideal state is the Republic, a text dedicated to the 
ideal state itself.  In Book V of Plato’s Republic, Plato addresses this 
question indirectly by advocating the inclusion of women into the elite 
class of Guardians. It is addressed indirectly for the Guardian class is 
comprised of only the most excellent individuals and Plato does not 
seek to determine the ideal role for all women in the state. Since we 
can only deduce what Plato thought the role of women would be in 
his ideal state from the comments he does make concerning women, 
this chapter will undertake a detailed examination of his proposal to 
elevate qualified women to the rank of Guardian. Many claim that 
Plato’s demand for equality in the Guardian class is insincere and are 
6
 
skeptical about the genuineness and breadth of his proposals. If this 
claim were true then we can barely state that Plato gave any serious 
attention to women’s role in his state but, as I will argue, this is not 
the case. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that Plato is serious in his 
proposal by providing evidence to support this conclusion throughout 
the Republic as well other dialogues, and that there is no such thing as 
an ideal role for women as such in Plato’s state. 
I.
 
No one can deny that Plato makes many derogatory remarks on 
the subject of women in the Republic as well as in various other 
dialogues,1 but whenever Plato makes such a remark, he never uses 
women’s nature as the explanation of why they act in the way he is 
critical of. In the Greek literary tradition of Plato’s time, women were 
condemned due to their phusis (nature).2 While Plato does use phusis 
and its cognates throughout many dialogues, in none of them does 
Plato use phusis as the reason for why he is critical of women. When 
discussing women in Athens, Plato offers generic criticism of how 
women behave, but when it comes to women in his ideal city who will 
be raised under ideal circumstances, Plato differs from the poets by 
judging women by the quality of their soul. If Plato thought that the 
ways women did not behave well were incurable, he would say women 
1 Phaedo 60a4-5, Apology 35b Timaeus 563b7-9, Republic 549c-550b, 550d, 557c, 563b-d, and 579b-c.
2 Levin 1996, 21
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acted the way they did due to their nature.3 If we do as Levin suggests 
though, and:
[E]valuate Plato’s derogatory comments with the distinction 
between current (or less than optimal) and ideal circumstances 
in mind, those remarks need not, and in fact cannot, count 
against the view that he seriously intends the proposal 
concerning women’s equality.4
 
In other words, Plato’s derogatory remarks towards women do not 
detract from his support for his proposal since the women he speaks 
poorly of are almost a different species of women from the ones he 
will make equal in his ideal state. The women in his ideal state will 
be judged by the quality of their souls, and those who are qualified 
to become Guardians will be rigorously educated. If Plato condemned 
women for their nature, then the discussion of the role of women 
in the ideal city would be brief and we would be forced to conclude 
that Plato did not make his proposals in Republic V seriously. If 
women were by nature incapable of ruling over their emotions and 
base desires, then not even Plato’s rigorous education system could 
overcome their inferior phusis. But, since women are not by nature 
incapable of governing their emotions, they can be taught to do so, 
and one can be confident that Plato thought his education system up 
to the challenge.
3 Levin 1996, 25.
4 Levin 1996, 24.
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Levin conducts a detailed study of passages that use words such 
as gune5 and thelus6 versus phusis in dialogues up to and including the 
Republic, and observes that when derogatory comments appear, 
feminine behavior is explained as the cause for the criticism rather 
than woman’s nature. By cross-referencing passages for words 
featuring gune and thelus as well as phusis and its cognates, Levin 
concludes that when these two terms are found in close proximity to 
each other they can be broken down into three types. In group one,7 
Plato’s attitude towards women is neutral. He offers neither praise nor 
criticism, and but for one exception, phusis and its cognates are not 
utilized; the exception where we do see phusis near ‘women’ arises in 
a context not strictly related to women.8 This case occurs in the 
Symposium at 189d-e when Aristophanes states that human phusis 
differs from the original human phusis as the original had three kinds 
of natures.9 The first kind was androgynous and contained male and 
female components.10 Considering that this speech is poetic is nature, 
a type of myth and not from the voice of Socrates or his account of 
5 Woman as well as wife.
6 The adjective “feminine.”
7 Passages in this group include: Prot, 325a6-b2, Menex 237d4-238a5; Symp 191a5-b4, 191c4-d3, 206c4-5, 
Rep 324e7-424a8, 451c2-6, and 620c2
8 Levin 1996, 25.
9 These natures will be explained in greater detail later in the chapter.
10 Levin 1996, 25.
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eros, Levin is correct that this use of phusis is not relevant to female 
nature.11
The second group of passages which concern women are 
negative in tone. When the assessments of women are negative, 
however, phusis and its cognates are rarely near the passage in 
question.12 The one time it is, however, at 579b4-8, has no relation to 
the question of women’s nature. While discussing the soul of 
tyrannical man Plato writes “He alone can never travel abroad to 
attend the great festivals which every freeman wants to witness, but 
must live like a woman ensconced in the recesses of his house.”13 
Barring this exception, one would expect that if Plato thought women 
were by nature inferior, he would have taken the opportunity to say so 
while characterizing them negatively.14 A particularly compelling 
example of this argument can be found in the opening of the Phaedo 
were Socrates attributes his wife Xanthippe’s emotional reaction to 
habit, saying that her emotional exclamations are “just the sorts of 
things which women are accustomed to say.”15 With the exception of 
620c where Plato does discuss women’s phusis16, none of the passages 
11 The next chapter, however, will look more carefully at speeches in the Symposium which are from 
characters other than Socrates.
12 Examples include: Apology 35b, Phaedo 60a, Republic 387e-388a, 550d, 557c, 605d-e.
13 Republic 579b4-8.
14Levin 1996, 25.
15 Phaedo 60a4-5.
16 I will go into greater detail concerning this passage later in the chapter.
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in the first two groups (neutral and negative) discusses women in 
relation to their phusis. In the third group where women and phusis 
are found close together, Plato does not provide a clear and direct 
answer. Rather, Plato uses this as the beginning of the discussion that 
I will examine: “Whether female human nature is capable of sharing 
with the male all tasks or none at all, or some but not others.”17 When 
Plato’s full attention is focused on the subject of women’s nature, his 
comments oppose the current attitudes towards women. Instead, he 
argues that the current state of women goes against what is natural18 
and begins to reflect upon women as they would be under ideal 
circumstances, when people are evaluated on the quality of their souls 
and are educated accordingly.19 
The positive comments concerning women’s nature do not 
only occur in Book V, the Book where women’s equality is the most 
relevant. At the close of Book VII Plato finishes his discussion of the 
education plan for the philosopher-rulers and writes, “You must not 
forget that some of them will be women. All I have been saying applies 
just as much to any women who are found to have the necessary 
gifts”.20 This comment is unexpected for women do not feature 
strongly in Book VII. Book VII is famous for its allegory of the Cave 
17 Republic 452e-453a.
18 Republic 456c1-2.
19Levin 1996, 26.
20 Republic 540c.
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and the education of the philosopher-rulers, so discussing women 
in this Book is not necessary and their exclusion would not raise 
questions. Instead, Plato abruptly brings women into the discussion to 
ensure they are not excluded from the rank of philosopher-ruler. The 
fact that Plato does so suggests that he takes the proposal of women 
becoming philosopher-rulers seriously. 
If a woman in Plato’s ideal state did not have the soul to qualify 
for Guardianship, she still came out ahead of Athenian women, for 
every child in the ideal city has a better upbringing. In Book II, when 
Plato discusses the early education of the Guardians, some of the 
passages also apply to all children born in the state. Plato’s quarrel 
with the poets goes beyond the scope of this dissertation, but in brief 
he criticizes poetry for setting examples of how to behave that are far 
from virtuous or worthy of imitation. Plato writes: 
 
Then we must first of all, it seems, supervise the storytellers. 
We’ll select their stories whenever they are fine or beautiful and 
reject them when they aren’t. And we’ll persuade nurses and 
mothers to tell their children the ones we have selected, since 
they will shape their children’s souls with stories.21
 
Whether or not Plato is correct as to whether poetry has such a 
profound effect on the moral education of children, for our purposes it 
is only important that Plato clearly believes poetry can influence us in 
such a way. Thus, if certain tales are not told to any children, then all 
21 Republic 377b-c.
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people in the ideal city will have a stronger moral core than the 
Athenians. A woman who is not a Guardian will still be in more control 
of her emotions than an Athenian woman, for in the ideal state she is 
not exposed to bad influences which might cause her to act in an 
undignified manner. Plato continues, “Such then…are the kinds of 
stories that I think future guardians should and should not hear about 
the gods from childhood on, if they are to honor the gods and their 
parents.”22 According to this passage, a girl raised in the ideal city will 
honor her parents and others more so than in Athens, so it is not an 
intellectual leap to conclude that all women will be better in the ideal 
state. Not all women will be Guardians, but the womanish behavior 
that Plato berates people for demonstrating will not tolerated in his 
state and children will be raised from birth not to behave in such 
ways. By way of discussing what is and is not appropriate for children 
to hear, Socrates concludes, “by the dog, without being aware of it, 
we’ve been purifying the city we recently said was luxurious.”23 
Indeed, without the excesses that cause moral decay, all people in the 
ideal city are morally superior to their Athenian counterparts. It is true 
that Plato never explicitly discusses the position of women outside the 
Guardian class, but for reasons that will be discussed later in the 
chapter, it does not make sense for Plato to keep women secluded in 
22 Republic 386a.
23 Republic 399e.
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their homes.      
It is important to note that many of the most negative 
comments regarding women are in Books VIII and IX, the books 
where Plato describes the degenerate types of states and souls, and 
the extent to which they differ from the ideal.24 In these sections 
Plato is particularly harsh towards women due to the fact that the 
spirited and appetitive elements govern their soul rather than reason.25 
One must also note though that Plato is equally as critical of men 
for having the same misrule in the soul. Moreover, there are many 
opportunities where Plato has the chance to comprehensively condemn 
contemporary Athenian women but he does not.26 Take for example 
Socrates’ statement:
We shall do well, then, to strike out descriptions of heroes 
bewailing the dead, and make over such lamentations to women 
(and not to women of good standing either) and to men of low 
character, so that the Guardians we are training for our country 
may disdain to imitate them.27
 
 While Plato is undeniably harsh in his criticisms of women, Plato is 
critical of everyone in contemporary society. Rather than seeing Plato 
as criticizing women for being ruled by their emotions, we should see 
Plato’s main concern as worrying that all people are ruled by their 
emotions and appetites.  
24 Republic 549c-550b, 557c, 563b-d, and 579b-c.
25 Republic 387e-388s, 431b-c, 469d, 549d, 549c-550b, and 550d.
26 Levin, Susan 1996, 24.
27 Republic 388a.
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Another quote which benefits from Levin’s claim that we must 
differentiate between times when Plato is remarking on women in 
Classical Athens as opposed to the ideal city occurs when Socrates 
asks:
Do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which 
the male sex isn’t superior to the female in all these ways? 
Or must we make a long story of it by mentioning weaving, 
baking cakes, and cooking vegetables, in which the female sex is 
believed to excel and in which it is most ridiculous of all for it to 
be inferior?28
 
In this instance Plato clearly references women as they were in his 
society, and due to the conditions that women in ancient Athens lived 
in, it was highly unlikely any of his interlocutors would disagree. In 
regard to his reference to men’s ability with housework, I believe we 
can understand this comment as an attempt to illustrate his point 
rather than a further indictment against women’s capacities. Plato’s 
next comment, “It’s true that one sex is much superior to the other in 
pretty well everything, although many women are better than many 
men in many things. But on the whole it is as you say,”29 is more 
positive than it appears at first glance. Even though he qualifies 
the “many women are better than many men in many things” 
with “But on the whole it is as you say,” Plato’s positivity in this 
passage goes even further than Levin’s argument. In this statement 
28 Republic 455c.
29 Republic 455d.
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Plato is not referring to women as they might be but women as they 
are, women in his very own society. Admittedly when Plato 
says “many women are better than many men in many things,” he 
possibly refers to the domestic arts, but it is still a statement in favor 
of women in present circumstances. I doubt Plato had any grand 
capabilities in mind when he states that many women are better 
at “many things,” but it is interesting that he does not qualify 
the “many things.” If women were by nature inferior to men, then it 
would stand that men should be superior to women in every respect.
II.
The relation of the body and the soul is of the utmost importance 
to this chapter since the answer will determine whether Plato seriously 
intends his proposals regarding women in Republic V. If one’s 
biological characteristics influence the quality of one’s soul, then 
one can say that Plato is not committed to making qualified women 
Guardians. Such a conclusion can be reached for if the quality of one’s 
soul can be determined by physical characteristics such as sex, then 
it can be argued that the biological characteristic of being a woman 
indicates an inferior soul. If being a woman is a sign of a lesser soul, 
then it is unlikely that any woman would ever have the requisite 
nature to become a Guardian. However, should the body and the soul 
have a minimal connection, and more specifically, should biological 
16
 
features be unable to indicate the type of soul one has, then we can 
conclude Plato deems that certain women can have the soul worthy to 
become a Guardian. Of course, Plato can claim in the Republic that due 
to physical reasons it is more difficult for women to be rational, but 
when they are, they are as fit as rational men. I do not think this is 
what Plato intends, but this question will be addressed in greater detail 
later in the chapter.
  The question of whether one’s physical or biological attributes 
are relevant to the caliber of one’s psuche is appropriately discussed in 
Republic V. Plato writes:
We have been strenuously insisting on the letter of our principle 
that different natures should not have the same occupations, as 
if we were scoring a point in a debate; but we have altogether 
neglected to consider what sort of sameness or difference we 
meant and in what respect these natures and occupations 
were to be defined as different or the same. Consequently, we 
might very well be asking one another whether there is not an 
opposition between bald and long-haired men, and, when that 
was admitted, forbid one set to be shoemakers, if the other were 
following that trade.30
 
Undoubtedly this example acts as a metaphor for the forthcoming 
discourse, but beginning the discussion with the distinction between 
bald and long-haired men is clever; an interlocutor would be hard 
pressed to say there was a qualified difference in the soul of a bald 
person and a long-haired person vis-a-vis shoemaking by the virtue 
of their hair alone, for some of Plato’s metaphors are more obscure. 
30 Republic  454d.
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Plato has already declared the premise that one’s ability to practice 
a certain techne31 is based on the caliber of one’s soul, so now is the 
appropriate time to determine whether biological and physical features 
influence or even determine the quality of their souls.32 According to 
this passage, Plato recognizes that while they have been focusing on 
the principle that people with the same natures should pursue the 
same occupations, he has been remiss in not stating clearly what 
constitutes this sameness in significant respects. By providing the 
example of the bald man, Plato frames the question of sameness and 
difference in terms of physical and biological traits. As we see with the 
hair example, purely biological differences are not reason enough to 
make a qualitative opinion as to the condition of one’s soul. 
Now that the discussion has been framed, the question we 
must address is what can the biological differences between men 
and women in their reproductive functions tell us about the quality 
of their souls? Reproductive theories at the time held that there was 
a correlation between reproduction and the quality of one’s mind, 
and this worked against women,33 for women’s role in reproduction 
was thought of as passive and indicated a lesser kind of soul. Plato, 
however, takes a different view and writes:
31 Craft, art, or skill.
32 Levin 1996, 27.
33  Mayhew 2004, 113.
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If the male sex is seen to be different from the female with 
regard to a particular craft or way of life, we’ll say that the 
relevant one must be assigned to it. But if it’s apparent that they 
differ only in this respect, that the females bear children while 
the male begets them, we’ll say there has been no kind of proof 
that women are different from men with respect to what we’re 
talking about, and we’ll continue to believe that our guardians 
and their wives must have the same way of life.34
 
The passage begins by reiterating the principle by which all decisions 
must be made in light of: one must do the job which one is suited to 
do by nature, so if one sex is better at one job than the other, the sex 
that is more suited to the job ought to perform it. If the only difference 
between men and women is biological in nature, and for our purpose 
here that “the male begets and the female brings forth,” then Plato 
has explained why women cannot be excluded from the Guardian 
rank due to sex alone. The popular view that women’s role in the 
reproductive process is a sign of the type of soul women possess is not 
even acknowledged. Plato makes no mention of any physical process 
that signifies the quality of one’s soul, for as we have seen with the 
example of the bald-headed man, there is none. What makes Plato’s 
omission of a correlation between reproductive roles and the soul more 
important than the cobbler example, however, is that reproductive 
roles are a far greater biological difference and importance than hair. 
By discussing the reproductive roles in such neutral terms as “beget” 
and “bring forth,” we do not even see an acknowledgment that 
34 Republic 454d-e.
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one might think that reproductive roles reveal the type of soul one 
has. Whatever doubts or questions Plato may have had concerning 
biological differences between men and women, he did not let these 
doubts overshadow his principle conviction that if people are judged on 
the quality of their souls then there is no reason that women and men 
are not capable of the same level of philosophical ability. 
This section has demonstrated why we cannot determine the 
quality of one’s soul due to one’s sex, but the next section will take 
this a step farther and argue that the soul itself is sexless. I will reveal 
how Plato’s dualist conception of the mind and body proves that his 
intent for qualified women becoming Guardians is sincere, for as Smith 
states “the reason it is unnatural to discriminate on the basis of sex in 
such cases is that the nature involved (the soul) is sexless.”35 The Myth 
of Er is where the argument shall begin.
III. 
The use of myth in Platonic dialogues is a dissertation in and of 
itself. While this project will be unable to go into Plato’s use of mythos 
too deeply, it will look at Plato’s Myth of Er and how it relates to 
women’s roles in the ideal city. In this section I demonstrate that due 
to Platonic dualism and the disassociation between the body and the 
soul as discussed in the previous chapter, the quality of one’s soul 
35 Smith, N 1983, 473.
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cannot be judged by sex alone. As we shall see in the Myth of Er the 
soul is sexless, thereby making any claims about one’s soul due to 
one’s sex false. 
To summarize the plot, the myth concerns the man Er who 
perishes in battle. Two days after his death he is resurrected and 
tells a tale of the cosmos and what he observed on his journey in the 
afterlife. My examination begins when souls from the heavens and 
souls from the earth meet in a field and are organized into rows and 
given lottery tokens. The Speaker tells the souls:
[T]his is the beginning of another cycle that will end in death. 
Your daemon or guardian spirit will not be assigned to you by 
lot; you will choose him. The one who has the first lot will be 
the first to choose a life to which he will be bound by necessity. 
Virtue knows no master; each will possess it to a greater or 
less degree, depending on whether he values or distains it. The 
responsibility lies with the one who makes the choice; the god 
has none.36
 
The point emphasized is that there is no predestination and every soul 
has the opportunity to determine what sort of life it wishes to lead. 
The Interpreter then lays before the souls many lives, and importantly 
as we shall see later, there are more lives than there are souls. Every 
sort of life is presented ranging from the famous and infamous to the 
unknown. The text focuses on examples that would have strongly 
resonated with the ancient reader such as despots, some of whom 
lived their lives and died while still in power and others who were 
36 Republic 617d-e.
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ruined and met tragic ends. Some lives would become famous for their 
beauty, talents, or high birth, but of course there were a great many 
undistinguished lives of men and women. 
The next statement discusses a key concept: the disconnection 
between the body and the soul and the soul’s superiority over the 
body. Plato writes:
But the arrangement of the soul was not included in the model 
because the soul is inevitably altered by the different lives 
it chooses. But all other things were there, mixed with each 
other and with wealth, poverty, sickness, health, and the states 
intermediate to them.37 
 
This comment demonstrates how the soul is independent of the body, 
for the soul determines which body it will inhabit. Not only does the 
soul determine its body for this life, but the soul makes this choice 
over and over again. The sex of the body is not a determinant as to 
the quality of the soul as Plato writes “But the arrangement of the soul 
was not included in the model because the soul is inevitably altered by 
the different lives it chooses.” This statement entails that the models 
of the lives do not predestine the ethical characters of the souls that 
will live those lives, for one’s soul will acquire ethical character from 
living that life, and hence cannot be fully determined beforehand. 
Influence, then, is mutual: the soul chooses a next life, including the 
body, but is then affected by the choices it makes during that life. 
37 Republic 618b.
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The Interpreter then states “There is a satisfactory life rather 
than a bad one available even for the one who comes last, provided 
that he chooses it rationally and lives it seriously Therefore, let not 
the first be careless in his choice nor the last discouraged.”38 Here 
again we see evidence that the sex of the body does not correlate to 
the quality of the soul, for if the last soul’s best option is a fourth-
century Athenian housewife, according to Plato it is still possible for 
this soul to lead a good life. Had this soul had a better lottery token, 
then it could have been in the body of a legendary hero or infamous 
tyrant. The element of chance shows how the body that one ends up 
in is part choice and part luck, but that there is no body that cannot 
house a virtuous soul. It must be noted, however, that while one can 
determine the body one inhabits, that body’s life will still be subject to 
the social conventions of its time. So even if a soul selects the body of 
a woman with great intelligence, it is unlikely that her wisdom will be 
appreciated by the men of her time.39
According to the myth, souls that had previously been in heaven 
tended to pick evil lives for they were not disciplined by the 
experience of earthly life, while souls newly arrived from earth were 
more likely to make a more careful choice. Plato explains:
Because of this and because of the chance of the lottery, there 
38 Republic 619b.
39 It should be noted that the thesis that lesser souls tend to pick female lives is never ruled out.
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was an interchange of goods and evils for most of the souls. 
However, if someone pursues philosophy in a sound manner 
when he comes to live here on earth and if the lottery doesn’t 
make him one of the last to choose…it looks as though not only 
will he be happy here, but his journey from here to there and 
back again won’t be along the rough underground path, but 
along the smooth heavenly one.40
 
This passage reveals that we cannot deem a soul that chooses to be in 
a woman’s body as a lesser soul. We must keep in mind that perhaps 
choosing the role of a woman was the least objectionable life available 
or maybe that life was exactly what the soul was seeking. Take for 
example the life of a slave girl as opposed to the life of a wealthy 
Athenian male. On a superficial glance the life of the privileged male 
appears as the better choice, but as the myth has shown us a body 
does not give us a clue as to the soul inside. Perhaps this man’s life 
will be dominated by violence and cruelty, he will become a murderer 
and a thief who uses his money and status to hide his crimes until 
he is eventually caught and is miserable in soul and circumstances. 
Take then the life of a slave girl, her life may be one of toil and little 
pleasure, but it may also be a life of contented simplicity. We see the 
desire for a simple life with Odysseus. We are told that in the lottery 
witnessed by Er, Odysseus’ token came last. Plato writes:
It chanced that the soul of Odysseus got to make its choice last 
of all, and since memory of its former sufferings had relieved its 
love of honor, it went around for a long time, looking for the life 
of a private individual who did his own work, and with difficulty 
it found one lying off somewhere neglected by the others. He 
40 Republic 619d-e.
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chose it gladly and said that he’d have made the same choice 
even if he’d been first. Still other souls changed from animals 
into human beings, or from one kind of animal into another.41
 
Odysseus is an example of one who has not forgotten the lessons from 
his previous life and made his decision with wisdom. Though he will 
not lead a glamorous life, Odysseus is careful enough to recollect that 
his soul has had enough ambition and has learned its lesson. In Plato’s 
account we find echoes of the modern cliché “don’t judge a book by its 
cover;” for all one knows the bird one sees houses the soul of Achilles. 
We can never know why a soul chose the life it did, for before the soul 
returns to earth it must drink from the River of Unmindfulness which 
causes the soul to forget all that has passed.
Plato demonstrates that as long as one is not very unlucky in 
the body one’s soul is encased in and as long as one lives virtuously, 
one is likely to find happiness in this life as well as the next. Plato 
writes “Er said that the way in which the souls chose their lives was a 
sight worth seeing, since it was pitiful, funny, and surprising to watch. 
For the most part, their choice depended upon the character of their 
former life.”42 What this entails is that if one lives the best life possible 
in every life one has, then one can be happy in every life without 
qualification of any sort for sex. A vegetarian43 might even see 
41 Republic 620c-d.
42 Republic 620a.
43 The Pythagoreans were vegetarians. Huffman, Carl, "Pythagoras", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) 
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justification for vegetarianism in this myth or at least justification for 
treating animals humanely, though no doubt this is not what Plato 
intended. Instead, what Plato did intend was to show that the body 
acts as a shell or container, but to judge one’s soul based on the sex 
of the container makes no sense. 
In order to demonstrate the disassociation between the 
soul and the body it is housed in, Plato gives us many examples such 
as Orpheus who ‘hated the female sex because of his death at their 
hands, and so was unwilling to have a woman conceive and give birth 
to him,”44 and “the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a nightingale, 
a swan choosing to be changed over to a human life, and other 
musical animals doing the same thing.”45 The two examples most 
relevant to this chapter, however, are those of Atalanta and Odysseus. 
Plato writes “Atalanta had been assigned a place near the middle, and 
when she saw great honors being assigned to a male athlete, she 
chose his life, unable to pass them by.”46 His choice of Atalanta is 
significant for she is hardly a typical Athenian woman. Atalanta, often 
considered a goddess, grew up in the wild and was an acknowledged 
fierce hunter. Her interest in picking the body of an athlete is 
unsurprising due to the way her previous life was affected by running. 
44 Republic 620a.
45 Republic 620a.
46 Republic 620b.
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According to the myth Atalanta had no desire to marry, so when her 
father attempted to force her into marriage she agreed but with one 
condition, she would only marry if one of her proposed suitors could 
best her in a race. Her father conceded and for a time Atalanta 
appeared safe for her suitors were put to death after she won the 
race. Her luck changed when Melanion sought the aid of Aphrodite 
who gave him three irresistible apples. When racing, every time 
Atalanta took the lead over Melanion he would roll an apple in another 
direction and she could not help but chase after it. This was how 
Melanion came to win her hand in marriage, and though this is 
speculation, one can imagine she was peeved at this result. Plato’s 
choice of Atalanta as the only soul who we are specifically told has 
resided in a female body in the Myth of Er highlights positions already 
discussed. Here, we are given an explicit example of a soul that was 
once housed in a female body becoming housed in a male body - and 
not just any male body, but one that will be honored for his talent. But 
Plato did not have to include a woman to demonstrate how the souls 
change body, for a man becoming a swan and a swan becoming a 
man is a far stronger example of this principle than a woman 
becoming a man. What is of interest, however, is that Plato could have 
chosen any woman from all of Greek mythology, so why Atalanta? 
It could be coincidence that female Guardians and Atalanta 
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appear in the Republic, for they do admittedly appear in different 
books. But, if Plato is serious in his claim that women can become 
Guardians, there is no better woman to use as an example in the Myth 
of Er than Atalanta. She is in many respects an ideal Guardian. The 
myth speaks of her virtue and physical skill, and while there is no 
specific mention of her wisdom, there are enough tales of her holding 
her own alongside men that there is no reason to suppose she was 
not equally sharp in mind.47 Regrettably, there is no way to know why 
Plato chose Atalanta for this myth, but we would justified in supposing 
that if he wanted to use an example that included a soul who wanted 
to become an athlete, then Atalanta is a perfect choice. No matter 
what motivated Plato’s choice of Atalanta and even if he did not have 
her in mind as one who in different circumstances could have become 
a Guardian, on every interpretation her inclusion demonstrates that a 
soul once housed in a female body can also be a great male athlete. 
Had Plato not been serious in his proposal, he had a myriad of women 
in Greek mythology who were not famous for their control over 
their emotions or proportional responses. He could have picked any 
character from mythology famous for irrationality and had her pick the 
life of a baseless scoundrel. 
Atalanta not only represents the potential that women 
47 Though admittedly her wisdom failed her when it came to the apples.
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have to become Guardians, but in a way she also represents the 
struggle that women face in their current lives to live up to their 
potential. Though Atalanta has the spirit and the skill of a Guardian, 
the circumstances of being a woman in ancient Greek society cause 
her to lose her freedom. Atalanta has no wish to marry but is forced to 
by her father, an occurrence any Athenian girl would face. Though I 
will not argue that Atalanta is the inspiration for women entering the 
rank of Guardian for there is no proof that this is the case, it is 
possible that Plato recognized Atalanta as a soul in a female body that 
with proper instruction could become a Guardian. Even if this was not 
done intentionally on his part, it underscores how with proper 
instruction women can become Guardians. How Atalanta’s life 
resembles that of an Athenian woman’s is that she also did not have 
control of her destiny nor did she grow up under ideal circumstances. 
Atalanta’s end is a sad one, for the myth says that after marriage she 
allowed Melanion to seduce her in the temple of Zeus, and having so 
angered Zeus he turned them into lions, for it was then thought that 
lions could only mate with leopards thereby preventing them from 
mating again. Had Atalanta’s soul been brought up under ideal 
circumstances, it is likely she would not have given into lust. 
It is possible that Plato thought there might be girls like Atalanta 
in ancient Athens, but that due to the influence of human institutions 
29
 
and conventions they were physically and intellectually stunted. 
Gregory Vlastos writes:
We should recall here his vivid sense of the power of a corrupt 
society to pervert the heart and conversely the power of 
education to improve moral character. Putting into context 
those woman-denigrating remarks, we can understand them as 
voicing what Plato thinks most Athenian women grow up to be 
in their present habitat, the domestic ghetto, which stunts them 
intellectually and warps them morally.48
 
In other words, part of the reason why Athenian women were 
susceptible to Plato’s less than complimentary remarks is due to the 
social institutions of Athens, but as Vlastos notes, Plato is not one to 
pay too much credence to cultural or popular values; he is aware of 
the damage that a “corrupt society” has on the soul and recognizes 
that once these influences are removed, women like Atalanta will 
appear.
One factor that many philosophers fail to consider is that not all 
women that Athenian men came into contact with were sequestered 
house wives, though even house wives had far greater responsibility 
and management skills then they are credited for. In Xenophon’s 
Oikonomikos the husband Ischomachus gives detailed instructions to 
his young bride as to how she is to manage his estate. In it he gives 
specific instructions for ruling and training slaves, housekeeping, and 
farming technology. These topics are hardly suitable for one with little 
48 Vlastos 1989, 25.
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intellect. Instead, the Oikonomikos presents a picture of the Athenian 
wife as a competent manager of a large estate. We must also pay 
close attention to Aspasia, a hetairai, or high-class courtesan for we 
know that Plato knew of her as she is mentioned in the Menexenus. 
Plato writes:
But I was listening only yesterday to Aspasia going through a 
funeral speech for these very people. For she had heard the 
report you mention, that the Athenians are going to select the 
speaker; and thereupon she rehearsed to me the speech in the 
form it should take, extemporizing in part, while other parts she 
had previously prepared, as I imagine, at the time when she was 
composing the funeral oration which Pericles delivered; and from 
this she patched together sundry fragments.49
 
Hetaera led significantly different lives than Athenian wives in that 
they were educated to discuss philosophy with their male clients, 
learned the economic and management skills necessary to run their 
own brothel, they were independent, and paid taxes. As a non-
Athenian and a hetairai, Aspasia was freed from the law that kept 
Athenian wives secluded in their homes and was therefore able 
to participate in Athenian public life. Though her marital status is 
disputed, she was the mistress of Pericles and their house became 
the intellectual meeting point of Athens’ most famous writers and 
philosophers, including Socrates.50 According to Plutarch, Athenian 
men would bring their wives to hear her converse despite her immoral 
49 Menexenus 236b.
50 Adams 2007 , 75–76. 
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lifestyle.51 It is clear from the passage above that Plato had a very 
high opinion of Aspasia and we do not see a single criticism of her 
or her speech. It is not astounding then, that Plato imagined female 
Guardians, for he did encounter intelligent women and praised them.
Plato had good reason to believe that better social 
institutions produce better women, for there were examples of 
proficient women in Plato’s own time. Women in Sparta did not live in 
ideal conditions, but the Spartan social institutions were so different 
from those in Classical Athens that it created different women. Unlike 
their Athenian counterparts, Spartan women were educated in the arts 
and athletics,52 owned more than a third of the land in Sparta in their 
own right, dressed in shorter garments to allow more freedom of 
movement, raised their sons until the age of seven, and with the men 
often at war the women were free to take charge of all state affairs, 
with the exception of the military. It is highly unlikely that Plato was 
not influenced by Sparta’s women when conceiving the female 
Guardians. If he harbored doubts that Athenian women were 
incapable of physical exertion or intellectual thought, he had only to 
look at Sparta to see that women who received training were capable. 
As long as Athenian wives remain in their current condition of little 
education and marriage at 14, it is unlikely that they will show traits 
51 Plutarch, Pericles XXIV.
52 Republic 452c
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that Atalanta or Aspasia posses. But, if Athenian girls were raised 
under ideal circumstances, it seems like much less of a leap to think 
that women could become Guardians.
One very important social institution which would be changed in 
the ideal city is that female Guardians are not responsible for raising 
their children. The result is that minus the actual process of giving 
birth, the female leads the exact same life as the male Guardian. Plato 
writes:
As the children are born, they’ll be taken over by the officials 
appointed for the purpose, who may be either men or women 
or both, since our offices are open to both sexes…And won’t the 
nurses also see to it that the mothers are brought to the rearing 
pen when their breasts have milk, taking every precaution to 
insure that no mother knows her own child and providing wet 
nurses if the mother’s milk is insufficient? And won’t they take 
care that the mothers suckle the children for only a reasonable 
amount of time and that the care of sleepless children and all 
other such troublesome duties are taken over by the wet nurses 
and other attendants?53
 
Clearly, on Plato’s view, giving birth is more of a purely physical 
process than emotional, for once the children are born there is no 
sense that the female Guardians will feel any loss or desire to raise 
a child. In the passage above, giving birth is depicted as a routine 
physical process; there are no mentions of emotions, irrationality, or 
sadness at not knowing one’s child. This is vital since giving birth is 
the main distinction between male and female Guardians. If giving 
53 Republic 460b-d.
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birth affected the rationality of a female Guardian, or in some essential 
way changed her nature, then female Guardians would be significantly 
different from male Guardians. But, if childbirth is just a physical 
process and it does not change the nature of the emotions of the 
female Guardian, then there is no fundamental way in which male and 
female Guardians are distinct.
IV.
The Republic is not the only text where the soul’s sexless nature 
is seen, for despite the negative comments about women during the 
stage-setting,54 the Phaedo champions this view. The Phaedo is set 
during Socrates’ final moments before his death as he discusses the 
Forms and the immortality of the soul. It is not surprising that in a 
dialogue where death is the climax, Plato’s dualism is more central 
than in any other dialogue. When discussing the soul’s immortality, 
and more specifically recollection, Plato considers the relation 
between the soul and the body.55 In his account of recollection Plato 
writes, “Our souls also existed apart from the body before they took 
on human form, and they had intelligence.”56 In other words, before a 
54 Plato asks for his wife to removed from his room so her crying will not disturb him. Plato writes that 
Socrates’ wife Xanthippe “broke out and said just the kind of things that women are given to saying: ‘So 
this is the very last time, Socrates, that your good friends will speak to you and you to them.’ At which 
Socrates looked to Crito and said: ‘Crito, someone had better take her home.’ So she was taken away by 
some of Crito’s people , calling out and lamenting.” (60a).
55 Levin 1996, 28.
56 Phaedo 76c.
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soul becomes encased in a human body, the soul has intelligence. 
One of the core philosophical points of the text is how practicing 
philosophy is in actuality preparation for death. Plato explains this by 
describing the nature of the soul and writes, “So the soul is more like 
the invisible than the body, and the body more like the visible?”57 By 
the invisible he is referring to the Forms and concepts such as 
sameness, difference and number whereas the body is more akin to 
the physical world of visible objects. He continues and writes, “The 
soul is most like the divine, deathless, intelligible, uniform, 
indissoluble, always the same as itself, whereas the body is most like 
that which is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, soluble and 
never consistently the same.”58 If we apply what Plato writes about the 
soul in this passage to the discussion of whether one can determine 
the quality of one’s soul according to one’s sex, we have further proof 
that the soul has little correlation with the body; if the soul has 
qualities such as divinity and constancy then the question of sex 
becomes relatively minor. 
In a certain sense it is more accurate to look at the myth in the 
Phaedo than the Myth of Er, for the Myth of Er differs from all other 
Platonic myths in how much choice the soul has in determining its 
next life. In the other myths, and probably closer to Plato’s thought, 
57 Phaedo 79c.
58 Phaedo 80b.
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the next body a soul inhabits will be determined by one’s lifestyle in 
one’s previous life. While there is a certain amount of choice in every 
myth, there is much more preordination in the Phaedo for the soul is 
an extension of the behavior that influenced its lifestyle. 
Consequently, if the soul is influenced by the lifestyle it led in its 
previous life, the souls housed in Athenian women will have a more 
difficult time improving the quality of their souls. If social institutions 
remain as they are, the souls in Athenian wives will have greater 
difficulty improving and will slowly become corrupt. If the lifestyle of 
the body can influence the quality of the soul, then it is unsurprising 
that Plato’s ideal state is so strictly run. On his view, all souls will 
improve from his education system, ban of inappropriate poetry and 
music, and life under the rule of the wise Guardians.  
V.
If we have any doubts as to Plato’s sincerity in making certain 
women Guardians, his earnestness in the following statement proves 
that his first commitment when it comes to determining profession is 
based in nature rather than sex. Plato writes:
We’ll say, I suppose, that one woman is a doctor, another not, 
and that one is musical by nature, another not…And, therefore, 
won’t one be athletic or warlike, while another is unwarlike 
and no lover of physical training? Further, isn’t one woman 
philosophical or a lover of wisdom, while another hates wisdom? 
And isn’t one spirited and another spiritless…So one woman may 
have a guardian nature and another not, for wasn’t it qualities 
of this sort that we looked for in the natures of the men we 
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selected as Guardians…Therefore, men and women are by nature 
the same with respect to guarding the city, except to the extent 
that one is weaker and the other stronger.59 
 
In this passage we see that men and women having the same abilities 
is not only limited to the Guardian class, but also that this principle 
applies to technai such as medicine and music. Plato’s final caveat in 
the passage above is not as problematic as many think. Plato issues 
a similar statement when he declares “various natures are distributed 
in the same way in both creatures. Women share by nature in every 
way of life just as men do, but in all of them women are weaker 
than men.”60 Claiming that women are weaker may not sound right 
to the modern ear, but it cannot be denied that Plato is in a sense 
correct. Modern athletics recognize that men are physically stronger 
than women, and accordingly do not let them compete against each 
other as it is unfair. A female athlete will be stronger than a physically 
inactive male and perhaps even stronger than some male athletes; 
physiologically though, most men are stronger. We should in no way 
conclude that women cannot be strong warriors and effective in battle, 
but only that they will acquire sufficient skills that will enable them to 
fight with and alongside men. It should also be remembered that while 
strength in battle is a crucial skill for a Guardian, for if the ideal state 
59 Republic 455e-456a.
60 Republic 455d.
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is to continue it must be able to defend itself, it is by no means the 
most important. What marks the Guardian from the rest of society is 
his or her ability to practice philosophy and comprehend the Forms. 
Physical training may be difficult, but many citizens could undertake 
such training, while the philosophical training a Guardian endures is a 
trial only those with the best nature can survive.
Philosophers such as Julia Annas are correct that Plato’s 
argument for making women Guardians is a utilitarian one, but this is 
not as negative as she assumes.61 Yes, Plato was partly motivated to 
include women into the rank of Guardian in order to widen the pool of 
candidates, but this is not the only reason. More importantly, Plato is 
only interested in how anybody can be of use to the state. His 
argument is partly utilitarian, but it is equally utilitarian to both men 
and women; everyone is raised to serve the state to his or her best 
ability and no one is released from that duty. In addition, Plato does 
not see service to the state, or as Annas terms it “usefulness,” as 
some manner of servitude.62 To Plato there is no profession more 
honorable than to serve the ideal state, and Annas fails to grasp the 
sense of civic duty that Guardians will feel towards it. Annas also 
reproaches Plato by claiming that even if a woman did not wish to 
61 Annas 1996, 8.
62 Annas 1996, 8.
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serve the city, Plato’s system would coerce her to.63 But, if Plato 
believes people ought to be compelled to serve the state, then he 
would believe that men as well as women are to be equally compelled. 
It is improbable that anyone would be forced to become a Guardian 
for it seems certain that one who did not aspire to serve the state 
would not have the soul that would enable one to become a Guardian 
in the first place.64 Guardians are by nature excellent and every single 
person of this rank must be of the highest caliber; a less than stellar 
Guardian is the downfall of the ideal state, so the women who will 
comprise the Guardian class must contribute equally. Nowhere in the 
Republic is there to be found any mention of female Guardians’ 
contributions to the state as being any less valuable than that of their 
male counterparts.65 
If what Annas is objecting to is how women in classes 
other than that of Guardian fare, then it is an equally unfair objection 
as the subject is never raised. If we are to speculate though, I assume 
Plato continues to uphold the principle that every person ought to 
pursue the activity to which they are suited to do by nature. There is 
no reason to think that Plato suddenly diverges from this fundamental 
63 Annas 1996, 8.
64 With the exception when trainee Guardians must be forced to return to the cave: “They must be made 
to climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness, which we called the highest object of knowledge; and, when 
they have looked upon it long enough, they must not be allowed, as they now are, to remain on the heights 
refusing to come down again to the prisoners or to take part in their labors and rewards,” (520a).
65 It is an acknowledged difficulty that all Guardians are forced to return to the cave.
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principle when it came to the lower ranks of his ideal state. If a 
woman’s nature suited her to practice medicine, then it makes little 
sense for Plato to waste her talent on a more domestic pursuit. Some 
women will remain in domestic labor, but it is possible that some men 
may be said to have natures suitable to such work as well. Plato is 
after a city which functions harmoniously, and the ideal city will run 
more smoothly when every citizen performs the function they are 
suited for. It is unlikely, therefore, that women are allowed to be idle 
all day and not occupied furthering the state. What is unclear is 
whether a female doctor would practice medicine equally well as a 
male doctor, but I believe we can assume so as we have already 
demonstrated how natures are irrelevant to a body’s sex. None of this 
is certain, but as Plato has been uncompromising in his principle so 
far, we have no reason to think he suddenly becomes squeamish. 
Annas does make a valid point when she writes that as soon as 
Plato stops thinking that the ideal state will ever exist in the Republic, 
he concurrently stops thinking women should perform the same 
functions as men. Annas writes “It comes as no surprise, then, that 
when Plato stops believing that the ideal state can be realized, he also 
stops thinking that women should do the same jobs as men.”66 Rather 
than see this as an indicator that Plato only endorses his proposals in 
66 Annas 1996, 12.
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Republic V on a whim, we should see that if the ideal state does not 
exist, then the principle that people should be judged by their nature 
also has no application. This argument provided the justification for 
how all of society functioned, not just women; as soon as this principle 
is no longer what determines people’s roles in society, the entire ideal 
state collapses. Admittedly, once the ideal state ceases to exist we say 
farewell to female Guardians, but to say that this is the whole position 
is to miss the much larger one; unjust men will rule the state. Plato 
is unconcerned about what happens to women after the ideal state, 
for it was never his intent to examine women’s role in society as it 
is. Instead, Book V demonstrates how the principle of judging people 
according to their nature will reveal that some women will have the 
nature of the Guardian and should partake in the ruling of the state. 
VI.
To return to the initial question of the ideal role of women in 
Plato’s state, I hope to have demonstrated that while Plato does 
intend his proposal in Book V seriously, the ideal role of women in his 
state is whatever her nature deems her best suited to do. If we extend 
the principle that everyone should pursue what they are best suited to 
pursue by nature to include women, then a woman’s role will be 
determined by her nature. As this chapter has shown, however, the 
sexless nature of the soul makes it impossible that a soul residing in a 
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female body is necessarily lesser than a soul in a male body. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Two
 
 
 
 
 
 
When a large part of a dissertation on the role of women in 
Plato’s ideal state then turns to investigate Plato’s Symposium, the 
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natural conclusion one comes to is that the author intends to make an 
argument focusing on Diotima, Socrates’ female teacher of eros. 
Diotima is a fascinating figure, especially for those attempting to 
discern Plato’s attitudes towards women, for while Plato often laments 
the poor state of Athenian women, he gives a woman a supremely 
distinguished position. Diotima and her theory of eros have been 
thoroughly investigated in terms of how they apply to women, but my 
investigation will only briefly touch on Diotima before addressing the 
main reason for my examination: Plato and his attitudes towards 
pregnancy and giving birth, for men and women.67 In the Symposium, 
a dialogue about Love, Diotima gives a detailed account of how men 
can be pregnant with ideas and give birth to true virtue. Intellectual 
pregnancy is clearly of great interest to Plato for the topic arises again 
in the Theaetetus where Socrates describes his role as a midwife of 
ideas. One may wonder what all this discussion of pregnancy and birth 
has to do with the role of women in the ideal state, but it is in fact of 
the greatest importance since in Book V of the Republic Plato claims 
that, besides women being physically weaker than men, the only 
difference between male and female Guardians is that women become 
pregnant and give birth. In Book V Plato explains that if men and 
67 There is not a lack of articles on the Symposium and women but surprisingly few of these pay close 
attention to textual detail and therefore come up with rather odd ideas which bear little relation to any 
Platonic theory. Examples include: Julia Ward 1996 and Anne-Marie Bowery 1996. 
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women:
differ only in this respect, that the females bear children and 
while the males beget them, we’ll say that there has been no 
kind of proof that women are different from men…and we’ll 
continue to believe that our guardians and their wives must have 
the same way of life.68  
 
I believe the proof that he fully supports this claim is seen by his 
discussions of pregnancy in the Symposium, Theaetetus, and Laws 
for in these dialogues Plato’s writings on pregnancy range from high 
praise to pragmatic neutrality. The Symposium and the Theaetetus 
emphasize the virtues of male pregnancy and birth, while the Laws 
demonstrates that Plato views human pregnancy and birth as a bodily 
function that does not fundamentally alter the nature or rational 
capacity of the woman. By demonstrating that pregnancy is a purely 
biological function with no relation to rationality and that pregnancy 
does not change one’s capacity to reason, Plato removes the greatest 
barrier women face in becoming Guardians. 
Before we begin, however, I will take the opportunity to do 
some stage-setting as Plato does. The Symposium, often considered 
Plato’s poetic and dramatic masterpiece, recounts a formal drinking 
party in honor of the tragedian Agathon after his first triumphant 
production. Phaedrus, a member of the party, laments the paltry 
treatment the subject eros receives, thereby giving the rest of the 
68 Republic 454e.
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party the idea to take turns orating speeches in honor of eros. There 
are six initial speeches with a seventh delivered by a drunken 
latecomer, but it is Socrates’ speech that is most unusual since Plato 
has Socrates not provide his own account, but instead reports a 
discourse on eros he had with Diotima, a priestess from Mantinea. 
Diotima provides a description of the “final and highest mystery” of 
the “rites of love,” though she doubts Socrates is capable of following 
her account.69 In her discourse, one begins the ascent of eros by 
loving an individual and ends by loving the Form of the Beauty; she 
states the Beautiful “always is and neither comes to be nor passes 
away, neither waxes nor wanes” as well as that it is “not beautiful this 
way and ugly that way, nor beautiful at one time and ugly at another” 
but instead “just what it is to be beautiful.”70 We are lead to believe 
that the party occurred many years previously and that Apollodorus 
who recounts the symposium was not himself there that night.71
Another point we must clarify is how we are to understand the 
term ‘Love’, or in Greek ‘eros’, both of which I shall use throughout 
69 Symposium 210a.
70 Symposium 211a.
71 The Symposium itself is told as a story. The true narrator of the story is Apollodorus, a friend of Socrates 
who was not present the night of the party in question. Instead, Apollodorus heard it from Aristodemus 
who was in attendance. To increase the distance from the actual event, we learn that it occurred many years 
ago as Apollodorus explains he was not there as he was a child at the time. By the time we come to the 
tale then, not only was the party a very long time ago, but since Socrates was an old man when he told the 
symposiasts about Diotima’s lessons and he learned them from her when he was a young man, Diotima’s 
narration to Socrates took place long before that. Unfortunately, not only is time against us, but we hear 
Diotima’s narration on a fourth telling: Diotima told Socrates, Socrates told the symposiasts including 
Aristodemus, Aristodemus told Apollodorus, and Apollodorus tells the readers. 
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the course of this chapter. In the Symposium eros has a quite specific 
usage. Here the emphasis is on the adult male’s position as an 
intellectual and ethical educator of the teenage boy, which was 
customary among Athenians whether it was sexual or not. Though this 
concept may seem unusual to the modern reader it was common 
enough in Classical Athens that Plato does not feel it necessary to 
define eros further; the conception of eros discussed here includes 
sexual attraction, affection, and love between men and women and 
between men and adolescent boys.
I.
What makes the Symposium interesting in terms of female 
Guardians is that while Plato does not address the issue of women’s 
roles in this text, he does give a woman a position of prominence. 
Plato discusses women in the Republic because he has to; when 
discussing the ideal state he can hardly ignore half the population. 
In the Symposium, however, where the issue of sex and the role of 
women in the state is not addressed nor are women much discussed, 
we are presented with Diotima. According to the Republic we are 
to judge one by one’s soul rather than one’s sex, but that principle 
only exists in the ideal city. The Symposium, which takes place in 
contemporary Classical Athens, presents us with an opportunity to 
look at Plato’s thoughts on a woman in a non-ideal state. We never 
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learn the specifics of her background, but we can be sure they are far 
from what Plato deems ideal. Plato does not only make her wise but in 
addition wiser than all the participants of the symposium, for Plato has 
her give the correct account of eros when all the men who preceded 
her could not.
Athenian females contributed to the welfare of the city by 
participating in a multitude of religious matters. In his play The 
Captive Melanippe Euripides writes:
And in divine affairs - I think this of the first importance -
We have the greatest part. For at the oracle of Phoebus
Women expound Apollo’s will. At the holy seat of Dodona
By the sacred oak the female race conveys
The thoughts of Zeus to all Greeks who desire it.
As for the holy rituals performed for the Fates
And the nameless goddesses, these are not holy
In men’s hands; but among women they flourish,
Everyone of them. Thus in holy service woman
Plays the righteous role. 
(The Captive Melannipe, frag.13, Page Greek Literary Papyri [420’s 
B.C.E.?]: trans. Helene P. Foley.
 
This passage demonstrates not only that women played a part in 
religious life, but specifically that women could perform religious duties 
men were incapable of. Though women spent the majority of their 
lives in the domestic sphere women participated publicly in religion. 
Athena Polias, or “Athena of the city,” the patron goddess of Athens 
and the chief priestess72 held great power and influence. The priestess 
of Athena Polias was worshipped in Athens but also played a role in 
72 The priestesshood of Athena Polias was passed down through the women of the Eteoboutadae family.
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international politics. Herodotus provides us with proof of her power 
and prestige when he recounts that in 508 B.C. Cleomenes, the King 
of Sparta, endeavored to interfere in domestic Athenian politics by 
going against Cleisthenes, a popular reformer. As the Spartan King 
came to Athena Polias’ shrine the priestess declared he could not enter 
since it was sacrilegious for a Dorian to come into the shrine (5.72).73 
Herodotus provides another example: in 480 B.C. the priestess agreed 
with the judgment to evacuate the city prior to the battle of Salamis 
and encouraged the citizens to comply by declaring that Athena’s 
sacred snake had already left the acropolis.74 It also should not be 
forgotten that Athena, the goddess of wisdom, was female.
In festivals such as the Panathenaea celebrated on the birthday 
of Athena Polias, both men and women participated but it was the 
young girls who played an especially important role. These girls, the 
kanephoroi, were virgins from aristocratic families and were given the 
responsibility and honor of carrying sacred baskets in the procession. 
Other festivals which both sexes participated in included the Lesser 
and Greater Mysteries which took place every year at Eleusis to pay 
tribute to Demeter and her daughter Kore. The Mysteries, which 
remained the most venerated cult till paganism ended, were 
associated with the cycles of the harvests and eventually became a 
73 Fantham 1994, 93.
74 Pomeroy 1976, 75.
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metaphor for man’s immortality. The Mysteries included two 
priestesses, hierophantides, and a group of priestesses known as 
panageis who lived in isolated conditions and were banned from any 
contact with men.75 The most prestigious of all was the chief priestess 
of Demeter who originated either from the Phileidae or Eumolpidae 
family. Any man, woman, or child who could speak Greek and had not 
committed murder was able to become initiated into the Greater and 
Lesser Mysteries. Only women were eligible to participate in the 
kernophoria, an opening ceremony where sacred vessels were carried. 
All initiates looked on as the women commemorated earlier women 
who danced in tribute to Demeter by performing sacred dances 
themselves.76
The important festival of the Thesmophoria, also in honor of 
Demeter, only allowed women to participate. The Thesmophoria was 
not as complicated as the Mysteries and resembled as well as acted as 
an agrarian festival. The festival occurred during the autumn to 
guarantee a bountiful harvest by way of the festival’s fertility magic.77 
The only role men played in the festival was that the sufficiently 
wealthy were obligated to pay for the festival on behalf of their wives. 
All women with an unblemished status78 were eligible to participate, 
75 Pomeroy 1976, 76
76 Pomeroy 1976, 77.
77 Pomeroy 1976, 77.
78 “Unblemished” refers to an unmarried woman’s virginity and a married woman’s fidelity.
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but all women were required to be chaste for three days previous to 
the festival and throughout its continuation. Sexual behavior was 
prohibited, but the women freely used foul language often found in 
fertility rituals.79 It is likely that female-only festivals existed due to 
women’s connections with birth and fertility and the desire to transfer 
these properties to the harvest. 
Plato and his contemporaries therefore would not find anything 
abnormal in a priestess speaking authoritatively.  When Socrates 
begins to give his account of eros he declares:
I shall try to go through for you the speech about Love I once 
heard from a woman of Mantinea, Diotima - a woman who was 
wise about many things besides this: once she even put off the 
plague for ten years by telling the Athenians what sacrifices to 
make. She is the one who taught me the art of love, and I shall 
go through her speech as best I can on my own.80 
 
If one argues that Plato creates a fictional character because he does 
not believe a woman can be wise, one could then object that the 
greatest fictional leap Plato takes is to make a human, regardless of 
sex, so wise.81Admittedly, Diotima’s fictionality is the strongest 
79 Pomeroy 1976, 78.
80 Symposium 201d.
81 It is also noteworthy that Diotima is not only wise but extremely powerful. To the modern reader 
whose only experience of the plague is through media such as literature and film, it may be difficult to 
comprehend how the plague would resonate with Plato’s audience. The plague of Athens occurred in 430 
B.C., during the second year of the Peloponnesian war. The exact number of deaths is unknown, but the 
losses were devastating. The plague not only claimed soldiers, but their leader Pericles as well. Things 
went from bad to worse for Athens, so by the time Plato began writing it must have appeared as if the glory 
days of Athens had passed. While modern historians vary on whether the plague played a significant role 
in the loss of the Peloponnesian war, it is likely that the Athens of Plato’s time would not only remember 
the damage of the plague but the stinging loss of the war as well. When considered with the history, Plato’s 
attributing Diotima with preventing the plague for ten years is to imbue her with incredible power. Donald 
Kagan. The Pelopennosian War. New York: Penguin Group, 2003.
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objection to claiming Plato believes that a woman is capable of being 
Socrates’ teacher since one can say that Plato creates a fictional 
woman because in fact he does not think it possible for a woman 
outside of the ideal city to possess wisdom. While I cannot definitively 
prove this is not the case, I do not believe it to be so; the concept of 
Socrates having a female teacher would have been extremely 
outlandish regardless of her being fictional.82 But perhaps the most 
obvious and simplest reason for using a fictional character is that 
Socrates never had the conversation in the Symposium with anyone at 
all, so if Plato were to give a historical person this role he would be 
guilty of falsely representing someone and attributing thoughts to this 
person that he did not have. In this respect, it is much simpler for 
Plato to be free from any historical restraints and create a character 
who could freely espouse Plato’s account of eros without having to 
worry about what this person actually thought. To continue on this 
thought, one common argument explaining the fictional Diotima is 
that Plato creates a fictional character to separate his own ideas from 
Socrates. Cooper writes that Diotima’s fictionality is how “Plato lets us 
know that this theory of the Beautiful is his own contrivance, not really 
an idea of Socrates (whether the historical philosopher or the 
82 An Athenian man would find Diotima’s role as Socrates’ teacher so remarkable that the fact that she was 
not a historical character would not take away from the novelty of her being a woman, indeed it made it 
more acceptable.
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philosopher of the Socratic dialogues).”83 While this is probably true, it 
still does not explain why Diotima is a woman, and if it is true, then 
Plato chooses to present his own views in the voice of a woman. 
Despite Diotima’s fictionality, Plato still chose to give a woman this 
role rather than give it to a fictional man.
II.
Before I discuss Plato’s views on pregnancy and birth it 
seems appropriate to address Socrates’ role in this process and why 
he needed a teacher such as Diotima on the subject of eros. In the 
Theaetetus Socrates explains he is the son of the famous midwife 
Phaenarete and that he practices the art of midwifery as well though 
he himself is barren.84 But rather than aid people in giving birth to 
babies, Socrates helps young men give birth to abstract ideas. Though 
he induces young men to give birth to their ideas, Socrates himself 
plays no part in the creation of these ideas. Socrates says, “And yet it 
is clear that this is not due to anything they have learned from me; it 
is that they discover within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, 
which they bring forth into the light. But it is I, with God’s help, who 
deliver them of this offspring.”85 A woman is aware of the great pain 
and difficulty involved in giving birth, but Socrates claims that the 
83 Cooper 1997, 457.
84Theaetetus  149a
85 Theaetetus 150c.
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process is even more painful for men when he states “those who 
associate with me are like women in child-birth. They suffer the pains 
of labor…indeed they suffer far more than women. And this pain my 
art is able to bring on, and also to allay.”86 But how has Socrates 
acquired this art if Socrates has not given birth himself previously? He 
may have learned the principles of midwifery from his mother but 
explains:
For one thing which I have in common with the ordinary 
midwives is that I myself am barren of wisdom…and that is true 
enough. And the reason of that is this, that God compels me to 
attend the travails of others, but has forbidden me to procreate. 
So that I am not a wise man; I cannot claim as the child of my 
own soul any discovery worth the name of wisdom.87 
 
It is unfortunate that this point is not elaborated upon since it is 
possible that Socrates’ barrenness is what causes him to know only 
his own ignorance, for if Socrates is barren he himself will be unable 
to give intellectual birth to ideas. Socrates takes the inscription at the 
oracle of Delphi “know thyself” seriously, and by knowing himself he 
is aware that he lacks wisdom. In the Alcibiades Socrates implores 
Alcibiades to “trust in me and in the Delphic inscription and ‘know 
thyself’.”88 Later in the dialogue Socrates demonstrates the inherent 
difficulty in the inscription when Socrates asks “Is it actually such an 
easy thing to know oneself? Was it some simpleton who inscribed 
86 Theaetetus 151a.
87 Theaetetus 150c-d.
88 Alcibiades 124a-b.
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those words on the temple wall at Delphi? Or is it difficult for me 
and not for everybody?”89 In other dialogues such as the Phaedrus 
Socrates claims to lack even this knowledge, “I am still unable, as the 
Delphic inscription orders, to know myself; and it really seems to me 
ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that.”90 
When Socrates states “I cannot claim as the child of my own soul any 
discovery worth the name of wisdom,” he asserts that his own soul 
cannot produce wisdom in himself.  
It may seem as if the discussion has entirely veered away from 
the role of women in society all together, but I believe one way to 
explain Diotima’s sex is concerned with the discussion of pregnancy. 
One possible explanation is the philosophically unexciting one that the 
discussion of giving birth is more natural coming from a woman. 
Considering Socrates’ declaration of his barrenness, how could Plato 
have had Socrates as the expert of giving birth, especially when he 
has no personal experience of it?91 
Diotima discusses male and female pregnancy, but for 
philosophical purposes she deals primarily with male intellectual 
reproduction. When men and women come together to reproduce they 
are “providing themselves through childbirth with immortality and 
89 Alcibiades 129a.
90 Phaedrus 230a.
91 It must be noted that we are unaware, and Socrates never inquires, as to how Diotima came to have 
knowledge of eros, though there is no reason to suppose that she does not follow the model she endorses.
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remembrance and happiness, as they think, for all time to come,” but 
the process is not very different for men. Men who are pregnant in 
soul, and Diotima states that men can be more pregnant in their soul 
than a woman could be physically pregnant, are “pregnant with what 
is fitting for a soul to bear and to bring to birth.”92 The reason that 
reproduction and pregnancy is the aim of love is that reproduction is 
the closest human equivalent to immortality; Diotima explains “a lover 
must desire immortality along with the good, if what we agreed earlier 
was right, that Love wants to posses the good forever”.93  Diotima 
describes that a lover is “turned to the great sea of beauty, and, 
gazing upon this, he gives birth to many gloriously beautiful ideas and 
theories, in unstinting love of wisdom, until, having grown and been 
strengthened there, he catches sight of such knowledge,” so Socrates’ 
barrenness bars him from reaching the pinnacle of thought.94 
There are many instances in the Symposium where Diotima 
clearly questions Socrates’ ability to fully comprehend eros, possibly 
due to Socrates’ barreness. 
“Even you, Socrates, could probably come to be initiated into 
these rights of love. But as for the purpose of these rites when 
they are done correctly - that is the final and highest mystery, 
and I don’t know if you are capable of it. I myself will tell you,” 
She said, “and I won’t stint any effort. And you must try to 
follow if you can.”95
92 Symposium 208e-209a.
93 Symposium 207a.
94 Symposium 210e.
95 Symposium 210a.
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She flatly doubts his ability to understand eros when she says “I don’t 
know if you are capable of it.” She agrees to attempt, even though 
she doubts the success of this venture, and one can imagine her doing 
the ancient equivalent of rolling up her sleeves to get to work on a 
challenge when she states “I won’t stint any effort. And you must try 
to follow if you can.” The previous passage is not the only instance 
where she voices concern over Socrates’ capacities to follow her lesson 
on eros. A little later on in the discussion you can see her attempting 
to keep Socrates focused on her message when she states “Try to pay 
attention to me…As best you can.”96 Diotima is clearly concerned that 
Socrates is incapable of fully understanding eros, though it is unclear 
if she attributes this fact to his barrenness or that he is just in fact 
incapable.
III.
This section will more directly address a topic briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter: Plato and his thoughts on 
pregnancy. Plato’s approach to pregnancy is especially interesting as it 
is often clinical or practical. When it comes to women giving birth, he 
seems to view it as a biological function, so once the birth takes place 
the woman is as she was before; if anyone is fundamentally affected 
by pregnancy it is men, though pregnancy affects them for the better. 
96 Symposium 210e.
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Not only is Plato’s interest in pregnancy significant, even more 
essentially he does not view pregnancy as a women’s issue or 
something that denotes inferiority in the sexes. Where Aristotle and 
others will take the view that pregnancy is tied to women and is part 
of the reason why women are inferior, by giving men and women the 
experience of pregnancy he demonstrates there is nothing in this 
process that affects the pregnant person’s rationality or quality of the 
soul, which lends credence to his stance in Republic V that the only 
true difference between men and women is that women need nine 
months away from their physical Guardian duties; once they have 
given birth they are just as qualified to return to work as they were 
before. Pregnancy is thus a purely biological process that in no way 
reflects negatively on women; how can it when Plato states that men 
can be more pregnant than women. If Plato looked down on 
pregnancy or had an inclination that it fundamentally changed a 
woman’s nature there would be reason to think that men and women 
are distinct in fundamental ways, putting the matter of female 
Guardians into jeopardy. 
By making pregnancy available to both sexes the sexless 
soul once again comes into play: the sexless soul indicates a soul can 
enter the body of any sex, so since both sexes give a kind of birth this 
suggests that all souls desire to give birth. This implies Plato has in 
57
 
mind a sexless or sex-neutral society, for by having men give birth to 
ideas and giving women the chance to govern and fight he removes 
the traditional male and female boundaries. There is no reason to 
assume this is not his intent, for if the difference in sex is only in the 
body and this does not affect the quality of one’s soul, what 
importance does sex hold except for the pragmatic concern of 
resupplying the state’s population. And, by giving both sexes the 
impulse to give birth it seems as if all souls desire this and that it just 
manifests itself differently depending on the body. 
One serious objection to this is that the Symposium and the 
Republic are not only different works, but works that do not cohere 
particularly well together. By applying the principles of female 
Guardians to the intellectual birth of the Symposium we face risks as 
well as many unanswered questions. For example, could two women 
give birth to an idea? Can a man and a woman give birth to ideas as 
well as to children? Perhaps most importantly: are people allowed to 
give birth to ideas in the ideal city? Would it create relationships that 
would interfere with the unity of the Guardians and would conceptual 
birth somehow interfere with human birth? Since Plato may not have 
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ever asked himself these questions we are unable to speculate.97 As 
far as thinking of the two dialogues in conjunction, however, I do 
not think it too risky to do so. As long as we keep in mind that the 
Symposium does not exist in the ideal state and that we do not know 
what Plato would have thought about intellectual birth in the ideal city 
amongst the ranks of the Guardians, I do not believe we are guilty 
of butchering Plato’s thoughts; I only intend to demonstrate how 
two different theories from two different texts support the view that 
women are not by nature inferior to men, rather that current society 
raises them to be. 
IV.
In this section we shall turn towards Plato’s views on human 
birth, the logistics required to ensure healthy children, and how female 
Guardians are able to return to their responsibilities and have their 
mothering duties delegated to others. In Plato’s Laws, Plato looks at 
female pregnancy in a purely objective manner. Like the Republic, 
the Laws is a dialogue about the construction of the state, but unlike 
the Republic the Laws is not an ideal society; this entails that when 
pregnancy is discussed, it neither tries to defend nor support a theory 
97 I shall engage in some speculation, however, for I do not believe that intellectual birth or the 
resulting “intellectual children” violate the conditions of the Guardian class. Guardians are prohibited 
from owning property and knowing their own children, but once an intellectual child/concept is born it no 
longer belongs to the parents. The idea which they have given birth to becomes the public property of all 
Guardians and therefore becomes communal.
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regarding women as the Republic does, rather, the discussion looks 
at pregnancy in purely practical terms. Such a discussion is vital for 
it is our first opportunity to understand to see Plato’s thoughts on 
pregnancy when nothing philosophical is at stake.
Plato’s approach to pregnancy in the Laws can best be described 
as pragmatic. He makes no value judgments and cannot be accused 
of sentimentality. Of course it must be noted that Plato’s notions on 
pregnancy are often incorrect or not based on modern science, but it 
is unfair to hold this against him as he only has the medical knowledge 
of the time. Incorrect as he may be, his incorrect views do not display 
any hint of bias. The first mention of pregnancy is clinical in nature 
and begins with a discussion of the “athletics of the embryo”: “It’s 
hardly surprising you haven’t heard of these athletics of the embryo.”98 
Plato describes the benefits of these athletics when he writes:
All bodies find it helpful and invigorating to be shaken by 
movements and joltings of all kinds, whether the motion is due 
to their own efforts or they are carried on a vehicle or boat or 
horse or any other mode of conveyance. All this enables the 
body to assimilate its solid and liquid food, so that we grow 
healthy and handsome and strong into the bargain.99
 
Whether or not motion helps digestion we see that Plato puts the 
emphasis on producing the healthiest child possible. It is not odd for 
Plato to have such interest in the production of his future citizens as 
98 Laws 789b.
99 Laws 789b-d.
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he needs the best possible citizens for his state. Clearly he thinks the 
first step towards producing a healthy and strong population begins 
before birth. To demonstrate this we can look at the precise guidelines 
he provides:
 
If you like, we could lay down precise rules (and how people 
would laugh at us!): (1) A pregnant woman should go for walks, 
and when her child is born she should mold it like wax while it is 
still supple, and keep it well wrapped up for the first two years 
of its life. (2) The nurses must be compelled under legal penalty 
to contrive that the children are always being carried to the 
country or to temples or relatives, until they are sturdy enough 
to stand on their own feet. (3) Even then, the nurses should 
persist in carrying the child around until it’s three, to keep it 
from distorting its young limbs by subjecting them to too much 
pressure. (4) The nurses should be as strong as possible, and 
there must be plenty of them.100
 
In this passage Plato gives specific instructions as to how a 
child must be carried in order to prevent the child’s limbs from 
becoming “distorted.” What is unusual here is the practical nature 
of the guidelines for they are in no way philosophic. It is true that 
Plato often discusses practical logistics in order to demonstrate 
how his theory can work; take for example the details of the living 
arrangements of the Guardians in the Republic. What is different 
in this passage though is that there seems to be no other end than 
producing healthy babies. We therefore have a non-philosophical 
discussion about pregnancy and childbirth which is of interest to us 
100 Laws 789e.
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due to the philosophical discussion of this topic in the Symposium. 
In the Symposium Plato extols the virtue of male pregnancy and 
birth, but as noted earlier he does not pay much attention to female 
pregnancy. While Plato does not have glowing praise on the virtues of 
female pregnancy there is nothing negative either; the tone is neutral 
and disinterested.
There is one passage in the Laws, however, that on first 
impression may appear as an objection to my argument. In this 
passage Plato finally turns to the emotional state of the pregnant 
mother and states that a pregnant woman must be monitored to 
prevent her from having intense emotional experiences. Plato writes:
All newly-born children…that’s the age when habits, the seeds 
of the entire character, are most effectively implanted. I’d 
even say…that all expectant mothers, during the year of their 
pregnancy, should be supervised more closely than other 
women, to ensure that they don’t experience frequent and 
excessive pleasures, or pains either. An expectant mother 
should think it important to keep calm and cheerful and sweet-
tempered throughout her pregnancy.101 
 
I would note first that nowhere in this passage is a woman’s nature 
or her inferiority to men mentioned. In other words, he does not say 
he gives his advice because women as such are more susceptible 
to undue pleasure or pain. The passage does not refer to women’s 
emotionality or reasonability as the reason they need to be watched, 
but so they don’t experience anything very painful or pleasurable. A 
101 Laws 792e.
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painful or pleasurable experience would elicit a reaction from a man or 
a woman, otherwise the experience does not have the quality of being 
pleasurable or painful; so while Plato is cautioning not to become 
overexcited, he is not cautioning them because they are women. The 
need arises from the belief that the mother’s temperament will affect 
the unborn child and from that perspective it makes perfect sense that 
the mother should be calm. 
The only reason to have a negative impression from this 
passage is the supervision which makes it appear as if the mother 
needs help achieving the desired calm. I do not believe this to be the 
case for if we look at the passage carefully the supervision is 
necessary to prevent the mother from having an intense experience, 
but we must remember that “experience” does not equal emotion. We 
must be careful not to confuse a pleasurable or painful experience 
with a pleasurable or painful emotion. If a woman needed to be 
supervised so that she did not have intense emotions then it would 
appear as if Plato thought a woman could not control her emotions. An 
experience, however, can take many forms and it is not difficult to 
come up with examples that might upset the calm of the mother. 
Painful experiences could include learning that a loved one has died or 
falling and breaking a limb which would agitate and upset the calm of 
any person; if agitation is thought to harm the child it makes perfect 
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sense to shield the mother as much as possible from such 
experiences. 
There seems to be little evidence that Plato views 
pregnancy and giving birth as anything other than a bodily function 
when it produces a child and as a desire for immortality when it 
produces true virtue. The fact that Plato views human pregnancy and 
birth as a physical process that does not affect the soul proves that 
women can be Guardians, and that with the exception of the nine 
months needed to have a child, once they have had the child they 
have not fundamentally changed. In the Republic Plato writes “Do you 
think the wives of our Guardian watchdogs should guard what the 
males Guard, hunt with them, and do everything else in common with 
them? Or should we keep the women at home as incapable of doing 
this, since they must bear and rear puppies, while the males do work 
and have the entire care of the flock?”102 Philosophers such as Julia 
Annas have raised the criticism that Plato’s watchdog analogy is a 
metaphor rather than an argument.103 I disagree with this as I believe 
that the watchdog example is exactly what Plato intends to argue, that 
aside for giving birth women Guardians are in no way different than 
men. I do agree with Annas though when she states that Plato 
is “taking seriously the idea that the life of the human female is like 
102 Republic 451d.
103 Annas 1996, 4.
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that of any female animal, with reproduction making only short breaks 
in physical activity otherwise like the male’s. No doubt this is because 
he is mainly interested in the eugenic possibilities for his ‘herd’.”104 It 
is true that in the ideal state Plato has strong opinions on how to 
create the best “herd,” but even in these arguments there is no hint of 
bias against female Guardians.
By this point in the Republic Plato has already abolished the 
traditional model of the family. One of the consequences of this 
action is that “no parent will know his own offspring or any child his 
parent.”105 This separation sounds cruel to the modern and perhaps 
even the ancient reader, but this statement is part of what enables 
female Guardians to be equal to the males, for by freeing the female 
Guardian of any sense of responsibility towards one specific child she 
in a certain sense does not become a mother. If the female Guardian 
does not know which child is hers she will not feel a pull to take care 
of her child, which would interfere with her primary role as a Guardian. 
In a certain sense Plato creates an extreme form of child day-care; 
a child is watched by a professional so the mother can continue with 
her professional life. We have already seen Plato’s explanation of this 
extreme day-care center, namely:
And won’t the nurses see to it that the mothers are brought 
to the rearing pen when their breasts have milk, taking every 
104 Annas 1996, 4.
105 Republic 457d.
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precaution to insure that no mother knows her own child and 
providing wet nurses if the mother’s milk is insufficient? And 
won’t they take care that the mothers suckle the children for 
only a reasonable amount of time and that the care of sleepless 
children and all other such troublesome duties are taken over by 
the wet nurses and other attendants?106 
 
While mothers who have children might see matters differently, Plato 
clearly believes he is doing the female Guardian a service by liberating 
them from “troublesome duties.” If the female Guardians appear to 
lack maternal instincts it is because she does. In Plato’s society she is 
a Guardian first and foremost who has the extra duty of giving birth 
to future citizens. If Plato thought female Guardians had maternal 
instincts then he would be creating a distinction between female and 
male Guardians, for if female Guardians had concerns besides the 
welfare of the state they would be inferior to male Guardians. One 
may object that modern society demonstrates that women can have 
children and a successful career, but in an unusual twist Plato is truly 
treating female Guardians equally by viewing them as Guardians first 
and their capacity to produce citizens as a byproduct of the body their 
souls inhabit.
V.
This section turns to Aristophanes’ account of eros in the 
Symposium, for though it is not the correct account, it indirectly 
gives insight into Plato’s thoughts on women. Aristophanes’ speech 
106 Republic 460d.
66
 
may provide support for the claim that Plato does take his proposal 
in Republic V seriously, and further the view that Plato did not see 
a soul that resided in a female body as necessarily inferior. It would 
be putting words in Plato’s mouth to claim anything definitive from 
Aristophanes’ speech, but it is also neglectful not to analyze the 
text. Aristophanes’ account of eros closely resembles the modern 
conception of soul mates and seeks to describe why people search for 
another person that will make one feel whole. The account is set in the 
past before humans were as they are now; these original humans were 
of three types, physically distinct having many arms and legs, and 
freely interacted with the gods. Aristophanes’ tale describes how these 
three kinds were the original humans were great:
in strength and power, therefore, they were terrible, and they 
had great ambitions. They made an attempt on the gods, and 
Homer’s story about Ephialtes and Otus107 was originally about 
them: how they tried to make an ascent to heaven so as to 
attack the gods.108
 
The first type as discussed in the previous chapter was androgynous 
with both male and female elements. The second and third types of 
original humans are similar in that they have two elements but these 
are of the same sex, so the second kind of human was composed of 
two male elements whilst the third kind of two female elements. 
There is something curious for our discussion about 
107 Iliad v.385, Odyssey xi.305 ff.
108 Symposium 190b.
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Aristophanes’ account in that there is no value judgment between 
the three kinds of original humans, or more specifically, there are no 
stated differences between the three types of original humans based 
on gender. There is nothing to indicate that the humans who were 
composed of two female elements are in any way inferior to the ones 
with two male elements. While sexuality is more prevalent than sex in 
this passage, as the objective of the account is discussing love rather 
than the state as in the Republic, the fact that sex plays so small a 
role is telling. The fact that there is no distinction between the males, 
females and androgynous humans indicates that when Plato does not 
have to prove women are equal, he does not do so and lets the facts 
stand for themselves. One would expect that if Plato thought female 
nature was inherently inferior, there would be some mention that the 
original females were physically weaker or that their thoughts were not 
as great as their androgynous or male counterparts. But as there is 
no such qualification, this lends support to the claim that Plato did not 
think that women had a naturally inferior phusis, for if they had, not 
all of these original humans would have been able to attack the gods. 
After Aristophanes explains the three types of original humans 
he continues his tale with the gods’ fear of them.  Aristophanes writes 
that Zeus creates a plan to weaken the humans:
[H]e cut those human beings in two, the way people cut sorb-
apples before they can dry them or the way they cut eggs with 
68
 
hairs. As he cut each one, he commanded Apollo to turn its face 
and half its neck towards the wound, so that each person would 
see that he’d been cut and keep better order.109
 
The text makes no reference to any distinction between the three 
kinds of humans. The original females are never portrayed as anything 
other than equal to the male and androgynous humans. Aristophanes 
then explains how the humans were so devastated at their separation 
that the humans embraced with their other half, willing themselves 
to grow back into one; but when they could not, they began to die 
from hunger and neglect of the body. Zeus pitied these men and 
women and reshaped their bodies so they could reunite through sexual 
acts and reproduce. After this second alteration we arrive at modern 
humans: the original androgynous became heterosexual humans, the 
females became lesbians, and the males became homosexuals.110
Even when discussing modern humans, however, Plato 
offers no criticism or qualifier for the women. He is only critical of the 
heterosexual humans and deems them lecherous: “That’s why a man 
who is split from the double sort (which used to be 
called “androgynous”) runs after women. Many lecherous men have 
come from this class, and so do the lecherous women who run after 
men.”111 He does not offer any explanation of why this should be so, 
109 Symposium 190e.
110 The translation uses “homosexual” to refer only to gay men reserving lesbian to refer to gay women.
 
111 Symposium 191d-e.
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but for whatever reason he clearly thinks heterosexual love is lesser 
than the other types. It is unsurprising that Aristophanes espouses the 
virtues of homosexual love, but what is most unexpected is his 
statement on lesbian love: “Women who are split from a woman, 
however, pay no attention at all to men; they are oriented more 
towards women, and lesbians come from this class.”112 One cannot find 
anything negative in this statement. Plato does not praise lesbian love 
as he does homosexual, but he in no way derides it or claims that it is 
inferior to any other form of love. Even his comment on male love 
does not make it seem superior to female love:  “People who are split 
from a male are male-oriented. While they are boys they are chips off 
the male block, they love men and enjoy lying with men and being 
embraced by men; those are the best of boys and lads, because they 
are more manly in their nature.”113 The only potential indicator that 
male love is superior is “these are the best of boys and youths.” Here 
I would bring in Levin’s argument from the previous chapter that Plato 
distinguishes between women as they are now and women as they 
might be under ideal circumstances. Considering that Socrates’ 
account of love will reveal that falling in love with bodies is the first 
step on the ladder to falling in love with the Forms and philosophy, I 
think this at that very least suggests that Plato fully supports his 
112 Symposium 191e.
113 Symposium 191e-192a.
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claims in Republic V that women can become philosopher-rulers. 
VI.
The Symposium therefore reinforces the argument that since 
Plato believes the soul to be sexless, there is nothing about the female 
body that makes it less rational than the male body. The two ways 
the Symposium does this specifically tackle two of the main objections 
levied against Plato which claim that he did not truly believe women 
could become Guardians: that women could only become Guardians 
in an ideal society and since this city will not be realized he does not 
truly think women could occupy this position, and that giving birth 
made female Guardians fundamentally distinct from male Guardians. 
To address the first issue Plato presents us with Diotima, and while 
she is not a warrior she is undeniably wise and given the credit of 
being Socrates’ philosophical teacher of eros. Had Plato not thought a 
woman could have had a philosophical nature then how could he have 
made Diotima the expert on eros? And while she is fictional it is far 
more likely she is so in order that Plato had free license in his theory 
without worrying about historical accuracy, rather because a real 
woman could not possess knowledge.
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Chapter Three
 
 
 
 
 
Plato’s Laws, one of Plato’s last works, is less well known than 
the Republic due to its length, dry style, and the often dull subject 
matter. Though by no means a pleasurable read, the Laws presents 
us with Plato’s second account of women’s role in society. The 
Republic and the Laws differ in many respects, but the most significant 
difference to our discussion is that the Republic presents an ideal state 
whereas the Laws does not. Unlike the Republic which does not have 
a spatial location, the Laws seeks to create good laws for a state that 
will be colonized in an area of Crete called Magnesia. Not only does the 
area of Magnesia exist, but it is picked specifically for the area’s self-
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sufficiency and distance from the sea.114 The Laws is often understood 
as a more pragmatic version of the Republic, leading Magnesia to be 
known as the “second best” state. There is evidence to support this 
claim as Plato allows private property and the family into Magnesia; 
two institutions he forcefully banned from the Guardian class in the 
Republic. Magnesia is a more realizable state, but it is a mistake 
to think of the Laws as only a compromised Republic. Plato himself 
recognizes that the reintroduction of private property and the family 
compromises the integrity of Magnesia when he states:
You’ll find the ideal society and state, and the best code of laws, 
where the old saying ‘friends’ property is genuinely shared’ is put 
into practice as widely as possible throughout the entire state. 
Now I don’t know whether in fact this situation - a community of 
wives, children and all property - exists anywhere today, or will 
ever exist, but at any rate in such a state the notion of ‘private 
property’ will have been by hook or by crook completely 
eliminated from life…It may be that gods or a number of the 
children of gods inhabit this kind of state…And so men need look 
no further for their ideal: they should keep this state in view and 
try to find the one that most nearly resembles it.”115
 
We should not assume, however, that this passage automatically 
indicates that Magnesia is merely a second best state; to do so 
is to fail to appreciate the distinct aims of each city. One way of 
understanding the difference between the state in the Republic and 
Magnesia is that the Republic’s is the ideal state whereas Magnesia is 
the good state.
114704a-705c. 
115 Laws 739d-e.
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It is unlikely that Plato thought a state like Magnesia possible 
when he wrote the Republic, for it was not until his later period that 
he became optimistic about people’s ability to achieve genuine 
virtue.116 The reason for this optimism can be found in a belief he 
acquired after the Republic, that non-philosophers have the capacity 
to attain virtue, though they will attain it imperfectly117. Now that Plato 
believes non-philosophers can achieve genuine virtue, he is able to 
devise new concepts of the good city and the good citizen.118 As we 
look at the role of women in Magnesia we must keep in mind that the 
aim of the Laws is to create the best laws it can for non-philosophers, 
but that these laws are not ideal and cannot make the citizens truly 
virtuous. A tangible result is a less certain role for women in 
Magnesia. With the just laws of the Republic’s state people were 
judged according to the quality of their souls, and to judge by any 
other criteria like sex was unjust. Women in Magnesia will have a 
more nuanced role in society than their female Guardian counterparts 
in the Republic. An important similarity between the Republic and the 
Laws, however, is that Plato is unconcerned with creating more justice 
for women. It is true that women are treated more fairly in Magnesia 
then they were in any actual state of Plato’s time,119 but greater 
116 Bobonich 2004, 374.
117  Bobonich 2004, 374.
118 Bobonich 2004, 92.
119 Laws 805d-806c.
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fairness to women was not Plato’s intention. As in the Republic, 
women’s improved situation in Magnesia is the result of his political 
aim to create a good state, but this does not entail that Plato had any 
particular concern with justice for women as such.
Some of the confusion about women’s role in Magnesia stems 
from the Athenian stranger’s120 own inconsistent positions regarding 
women and the negative remarks he makes concerning women’s 
nature. In this chapter I shall address these inconsistencies and 
negative remarks, and demonstrate how neither lead to the conclusion 
that Plato views female citizens as inferior to the men. Acknowledging 
that the role of female citizens in Magnesia is not as definitively equal 
to the men’s as it was in the Republic, the reintroduction of the family 
and private property are not the main cause. Rather, the main cause 
is the colonizers of Magnesia themselves, for they bring their own 
prejudices and ideas on what is natural for women into the new state. 
Plato, however, is prepared for such an eventuality and writes:
It shall not be left up to the father’s wish to decide who shall 
attend and whose education shall be neglected, but rather, as 
the saying goes, ‘every man and child insofar as he is able,’ 
must of necessity become educated, because they belong more 
to the city than those who generated them. Indeed, my law 
would say all the very same things about females that it says 
about males, including that females should be trained equally.121
 
120 In the Laws the Athenian stranger occupies Socrates’ usual role.
121 Laws 804d-e.
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From this statement we can infer that Plato acknowledges some early 
colonizers will disapprove of women being educated, but that such 
resistance will be met and will eventually disappear through the good 
laws of Magnesia.
In this chapter I hope to demonstrate that Plato conceives that 
the women of Magnesia are not inherently inferior to the men, but he 
recognizes that he will need specific laws to turn the domesticated and 
uneducated Athenian women into educated citizens who fight in the 
military and run for elected office. In the Republic we saw that Plato 
understood the power social institutions have in shaping people, so 
while the good laws in Magnesia can create good women, he will need 
laws to undo the generations of habituation they have been subjected 
to. The reason we see comments on women’s inferior nature and laws 
focused on ridding them of their “feminine traits” is that in order for 
the women in Magnesia to be the equal members he envisages them 
as, he will have to fundamentally alter the colonizers’ conception of 
what is natural for women. 
I.
Just as scholarly opinion is sharply divided on Plato’s views 
of women in the Republic, so too we find great controversy about the 
Laws. This is hardly surprising as the women in Magnesia are similar 
to female Guardians with the important exception that the women in 
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Magnesia will be part of a family.122 Part of the uncertainty in the Laws 
stems from the fact that we know the reintroduction of the family and 
private property will affect women, but how these effects take shape 
is unclear. It is tempting to agree with Susan Okin when she states 
that “Despite all his professed intentions in the Laws to emancipate 
women and make full use of the talents he was now convinced they 
had, Plato’s reintroduction of the family has the direct effect of putting 
them firmly back into their traditional place.”123 It is easy to assume 
that the family will affect women’s role in society, but we have no 
specific reason to do so; indeed, to do this may be to make the very 
assumptions about the ‘proper place’ of women that Plato is 
attempting to dispel. The wife and mother in Magnesia bears no 
resemblance to her Classical Athenian counterpart or the traditional 
archetype of housewife: women in Magnesia do not prepare meals for 
their families due to the communal meals, slaves are responsible for 
work in the field and the home,124 and children are sent off to their 
teachers at dawn.125 Like men, women are educated, fight in the 
military, and hold elected office. 
The Athenian sets the appropriate ages for marriage, entering 
public office, and military service for men and women, and here we 
122 This exception applies equally to the men.
123 Okin (1979, p. 50).
124 Laws 806e.
125 Laws 808d.
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can see that men and women will participate in these activities with 
the only significant difference being when they start:
A girl should marry between the ages of sixteen and twenty…and 
a boy between thirty and thirty-five. A woman can enter office 
at forty, a man at thirty. A man is subject to service in war from 
the age of twenty until the age of sixty; in whatever military 
services it seems women should be employed, each will be 
ordered to do what is possible and fitting for her, after she has 
borne children and until she is fifty years old.126 
 
Several things must be mentioned about this passage, but the 
overarching theme is one that gives women the same opportunities as 
men. Let us begin with the marriage age of women. Sixteen sounds 
young to the modern reader, but is quite late for a woman to be 
marrying in the ancient world. In Classical Athens the ideal marriage 
situation included a fourteen year old girl marrying a thirty year old 
man.127 Fourteen and sixteen may not seem like a significant age 
difference, but we also must remember that a great deal of maturation 
may occur during those two years and sixteen is the absolute 
minimum age for marriage in Magnesia.
 The passage above explicitly states that women can hold 
elected office; the only distinction between men and women is that 
women must wait ten years longer. Plato does not provide an explicit 
reason for the delay, but it seems reasonable that it is related to 
reproductive concerns rather than apprehension over a woman’s 
126 Laws 785c.
127 Pomeroy 1976, 64.
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ability to perform the job at a younger age. At the age of thirty, when 
a man can enter office, a woman is in the middle of her childbearing 
years. If we keep in mind that a woman may be married as late as 
twenty, Plato will expect her to produce children into her late thirties. 
By having women enter office at forty, he suggests that a woman can 
enter office as soon as she has finished her duty of producing children. 
The twenty-year child-bearing period is of vital importance to the re-
population of the state, so it is unsurprising that Plato would not have 
them enter office while they are repopulating Magnesia.128 Admittedly, 
Plato has another option: allowing women to serve in office while 
pregnant and accept that they will need some time off to give birth. It 
is interesting Plato does not take this option for he could easily create 
a sophisticated day-care system enabling women to return to work 
as soon as the baby is born as in the Republic, but there is evidence 
that Plato thought women holding office while pregnant might create 
difficulties for the pregnancy. 
In the previous chapter I noted that in the Laws Plato 
states that pregnant women must remain calm, cheerful, and avoid 
extreme pleasure or pain.129 Considering the grave responsibilities, 
duties, and decisions the elected officials must deal with, no official 
128 Although we do not know the infant mortality rate in Classical Athens, we can assume it was quite 
high by modern standards. A lack of medical knowledge, unhygienic conditions, and a host of other factors 
made childbirth dangerous for the mother and child.
129 Laws 792e.
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could always remain calm and cheerful. If pregnant women are to 
remain in a peaceful state then they cannot engage in the 
complexities and challenges of holding office for nine months. One 
could argue that women will not be pregnant for the entire ten years 
from age thirty to forty, so Plato could allow women at thirty to hold 
office but make them temporarily resign during their pregnancy. This 
solution, however, raises more problems than it solves. The first 
logistical issue is replacing the pregnant women for nine months. If 
women are elected, then how can they be replaced? Matters also 
become more complex when we remember that women in the ancient 
world had far less, if any, control over when they had children. This 
fact has consequences for female officials of childbearing age, for the 
women will have no control over when they become pregnant; women 
could become pregnant during the middle of an important project or 
when one woman is for some reason irreplaceable. The far simpler 
measure is to avoid such complexities altogether and have women 
begin work at forty.130 
A significant difference between the lives of female 
Guardians and the women of Magnesia is that the female Guardians 
130 Women not only begin their political careers later but they must also end their military duties earlier. 
Men serve in the military until they turn sixty whereas women only serve until they are fifty. One possible 
cause for this is that women’s bodies likely wore out earlier. Without any birth control and with women 
marrying at a young age, a woman could easily have ten children by her fortieth birthday. A significant 
amount of pregnancies, without modern medical treatment, combined with ten years of military service 
could cause a woman’s body to weaken faster than a man’s. More importantly, however, is that there is no 
age where men or women are made to leave elected office.
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seem much less interrupted by pregnancy. While it is possible that 
Plato for some reason thinks Magnesian women are less equipped to 
hold office while pregnant than the female Guardians, there are two 
more plausible reasons. The first is that the Republic is not concerned 
with the logistics of human pregnancy. The discourse of the Republic 
concerns the structure and nature of the ideal state, so an in-depth 
inquiry as to what makes a healthy pregnancy and baby would be out 
of context. The discourse of the Laws, however, aims to give 
philosophic as well as practical measures, so a discussion on what 
women must do and not do to produce strong children is relevant. The 
only comment on the logistics of a female Guardian’s pregnancy131 
is “a woman is to bear children for the city from the age of twenty to 
the age of forty.”132 Given the fact that Plato imagines the female 
Guardians and female Magnesians having similar age-ranges for giving 
birth, it is not impossible that had Plato thought of the pragmatics of 
female Guardians having children, he would have also cautioned them 
to avoid extreme pleasures and pains and to remain calm during their 
pregnancies. Perhaps one reason that female Guardians are less 
affected by pregnancy than women in Magnesia is due to Plato’s 
education system. In Magnesia, women old enough to have children 
131 I mean “pregnancy” to refer to the nine month gestation period rather than the process of becoming 
pregnant, for Plato has much to say on that topic. 
132 Republic 460e.
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will have likely completed their education and are competent to hold 
office. As there is no mention of boys being better educated than 
woman or of male office-holders being more competent than female 
ones, there is no reason to think that women of childbearing age 
would be unfit to hold office. Female Guardians, on the other hand, 
are still in the midst of their studies. Plato writes:
From the age of twenty…the subjects they learned in no 
particular order as children they must now bring together to 
form a unified vision of their kinship both with one another 
and with the nature of that which is…you’ll have to look out for 
the ones who most of all have this ability…And after they have 
reached their thirtieth year…you’ll have to test them by means of 
the power of dialectic.133
 
Studying mathematics and dialectic is extremely challenging, but 
oddly enough ideal for Plato’s conception of pregnant women. Pursuing 
mathematics and dialectic requires intense concentration, reasoning, 
and excludes extreme emotional responses and passions. In this 
respect, a pregnant woman can continue her study of these subjects 
without any threat to her pregnancy. It is true that physical training 
continues during this period,134 but this is merely maintenance as 
most physical skills were developed at a younger age.135 Since this 
discussion occurs during Book VII, long past the description of 
female Guardians, there is no mention of pregnant women studying 
133 Republic 537b-537d.
134 Republic 537c.
135 Republic 537b.
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mathematics and dialectic, so we do not know for certain if Plato made 
this association. Regardless, female Guardians from twenty to forty 
will not have their studies inconvenienced by pregnancy, but the duties 
and politics of elected office entail that Magnesian women cannot be 
pregnant while holding office. 
It appears as if every office is open to women after the age of 
forty but there is one office for which only women are qualified. Here 
Plato is perhaps guilty of reverting to traditional sex stereotypes or 
acknowledging that in the less than perfect state sex-based roles exist, 
but in any case women are in charge of marriage. Plato writes that 
marriages:
Should be supervised by the women whom we have chosen136 
(several or only a few - the officials should appoint the number 
they think right, at times within their discretion). These women 
must assemble daily at the temple of Eileithuia…and when they 
have convened each must report to her colleagues any wife or 
husband of childbearing age she has seen who is concerned with 
anything but the duties imposed on him or her at the time of the 
sacrifices and rites of their marriage. 
 
If the primary aim of marriage is to produce children, then it is not 
difficult to understand why Plato gave this position to women. Instead 
of seeing this as a regression back to traditional stereotypes, we can 
also recognize the fact that Plato is entrusting the welfare of this vital 
institution to women. Plato is rightly concerned with marriage, for its 
136 But as Cooper notes [1456] “No such women have been mentioned. In other ways too the state of the 
text hereabouts suggests a lack of revision.” 
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product, children, is essential for Magnesia to continue. If Plato was 
concerned women would regress once back in the family, he was not 
concerned enough to give this imperative responsibility to men.
II.
Despite the reemergence of the family and private 
property, there is no indication that Plato has reversed his belief that 
men and women have the same capacity for virtue, or that there is 
any connection between the two. According to Susan Okin,137 Plato 
believes that equality between the sexes is political and can only exist 
in conditions such as those in Book V of the Republic, so once private 
property and the family return in the Laws, women return to the 
household.138 While it is true that women in Magnesia lose some of the 
privileges that created the equality of the sexes female Guardians 
enjoyed in the Republic, such as the permanent nursery and wet-
nurses which allowed female Guardians to return to work as soon as 
they gave birth, there is no reason to think the women of Magnesia 
will be essentially distinct from, or inferior to, the men. If the only 
differences between men and women remain that women are 
physically weaker and give birth, then there is no reason to assume 
that the return of private property and the family will significantly alter 
137 Okin 1979, 31, 42.
138 While Okin’s beliefs seem unwarranted, it is important to note that her writings are from over 
thirty years ago and she was one the first philosophers to look at Plato from a feminist perspective. Her 
conclusions now seem conservative, but at the time they were published they were groundbreaking. 
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the women in Magnesia. 
The specific reason that the family was abolished in the 
Republic was not that it hinders sex equality, for that is not what 
concerns Plato, but that the family and the preferences and affections 
that come with it are unjust; the family causes the placement of 
disproportionate value on the welfare of friends and family.139 Socrates 
takes great pains to demonstrate that the second wave of Book V in 
the Republic is necessary, for a family will contain its own allegiances. 
In essence, without the family, the community itself is of the utmost 
importance to every citizen. With each citizen sharing an attachment 
to the same goal, we see a completely just community where, with 
complete solidarity, everyone cares for each other and the state. 
With the introduction of private property and the nuclear family into 
Magnesia, however, its citizens will be inclined to nourish such private 
attachments. Aware of this inevitable result, Plato envisages laws 
to keep such attachments to a minimum and maximize the concern 
one feels for the entire community. One such law is the mandatory 
communal meals, for by eating with other citizens an individual citizen 
will widen the ties that one feels towards one’s family and extend them 
towards the entire community. 
Susan Okin is concerned that women cannot own property, but 
139 Forde 1997, 664. It is possible that by the time Plato began writing the Laws, he was aware of 
Aristotle’s criticisms of the Republic.
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this does not necessarily have any connection to women’s capacities. 
The Athenian stranger does not provide a reason for not allowing 
women to own property, but I think it is safe to conclude that Plato 
imagined all women old enough to own property to be married and 
producing children. One could why women past child-bearing age 
could not own property, but I suspect Plato did not see a reason why 
a woman owning property would better the state. Though I do not 
believe there are specific provisions for widows, with the concern that 
every citizen is meant to feel for the whole community it is easy to 
imagine her living with one of her children. That being said, very few 
citizens benefited from Magnesia’s property and inheritance laws, for 
unless you were the favorite son, you would not inherit your father’s 
property; any other children in the family, even the non-favorite sons, 
would not inherit anything. If the property laws are unfair to women, 
then they are similarly unfair to sons:
As for the other children, in cases where there are more than 
one, the head of the family should marry off the females in 
accordance with the law we shall establish later; the males he 
must present for adoption to those citizens who have no children 
of their own ˗ priority to be given to personal preferences as far 
as possible.140
 
By not being able to inherit or own private property, parents have no 
reason to love one daughter more than another, or to even approach 
their daughters with that mindset. When parents have more than one 
140 Laws740b-e.
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son, they must actively think which about which one they love more, 
and they have reason to not love the other sons as much as they will 
either be adopted or leave Magnesia altogether.
The marriage laws for daughters not only entail that all 
daughters are treated equally, but also assume that a father will pick 
a prospective son-in-law based on his suitability with his daughter. 
Such sentiment is best expressed when the Athenian discusses 
marriage arrangements for a family with only daughters. The Athenian 
states that the father:
must forgive that lawgiver if he arranges the giving of them 
in marriage with an eye on only two out of three possible 
considerations: close kinship, and the security of the estate. 
The third point, which a father would have taken into account - 
namely to select from among the entire citizen body someone 
whose character and habits qualify him to be his own son and his 
daughter’s bridegroom - these considerations, I say, will have to 
be passed over, because it’s impractical to weigh them.141
 
In this passage there is no mention of preferring one daughter to 
another, or any indication that a father has any motivation or need to 
love one daughter at the expense of another. Instead, this passage 
assumes that a father will look for a husband that he believes is 
worthy to be his son-in-law. Women also have the advantage in 
marriage over men, for even if there is a shortage of men in Magnesia, 
girls are not forced to find new adoptive parents or emigrate to a new 
colony. In fact, if this is the case, a girl gets to choose a husband from 
141 Laws 924c-d.
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another colony. The Athenian states:
If a girl is hard put to find a husband among her compatriots, 
and has in view someone who has been dispatched to a colony 
whom she would like…then if the man is related to her, he 
should enter into the state under the provisions of the law; if he 
is not of her clan…he shall be entitled by virtue of the choice of 
the daughter of the deceased…and return to his homeland.142
 
Here we have a situation where a girl picks her husband, and it is 
unclear whether the husband has much choice to refuse. Marriage and 
inheritance laws in Magnesia are complex, but men suffer more from 
them as it forces their parents to love their sons unequally.
In Magnesia there is a great emphasis on compatibility 
and equal legal rights for men and women in marriage. Of particular 
note are the divorce laws which are far fairer towards women than the 
laws in Classical Athens. In Magnesia, divorce depends upon the 
agreement of ten Guardians and the ten women who are responsible 
for marriage. These members will make up a court in order to 
determine whether there is no possibility of saving the couples’ 
marriage. If the court decides that reconciliation cannot occur, the 
couple may part ways and the court shall attempt to find new partners 
for the male and female.143 The Magnesian procedure greatly differs 
from Athenian divorce, where a husband could send his wife back to 
her family or guardian without any legal action; the wife did at least 
142 Laws 925b-c.
143 Chase 1993, 148. Laws 929e-930a.
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get to keep her dowry. 144 This system was not only unfair to women in 
that no legal process was necessary for their husbands to divorce 
them, but it was also extremely difficult for a woman to divorce her 
husband. A wife could only divorce her husband with the aid of her 
former guardian, and then present the Archon with a writ of divorce 
that had to be successfully defended.145 Another legal departure from 
Classical Athens is that in Magnesia, a woman over the age of forty 
and without a husband can act as an associate in a legal case and can 
bring suit as well.146 In Athens, a woman could do little without a male 
as her legal representative.147 
III.
In the second chapter I argued that Plato was aware of wise 
priestesses such as Diotima and educated courtesans like Aspasia, 
so even though his comments on idle Athenian housewives are 
unforgiving, he knew not all women were in such a poor state. Plato 
was aware different Greek states gave women different roles, and 
put this empirical knowledge to work in the Laws. Such knowledge is 
vital for it demonstrates the power of habituation, enabling Plato to 
look at a society’s institutions and see how they affect women. Had 
144 Lysias, Against Alcibiades, I, 28; Pseudo-Demosthenes, Against Neaera, 51 ff.,  82 ff. 
145 Demosthenes, Against Onetor, I, 17, 26, 31; Isaeus, On the Estate of Pyrrhus, 78.  Andocides, Against 
Alcibiades, 14, Alcibiades wife was forced to go the Archon without her legal protector. 
146 Chase 1933, 160.
147 Isaeus, On the Estate of Pyrrhus, 2-3.
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Plato thought the women in Magnesia were not potentially virtuous or 
good, he could have treated them as the Thracians did: “What about 
the practice of the Thracians and many other peoples, who make their 
women work on the land and mind sheep and cattle, so that they turn 
into skivvies indistinguishable from slaves?”148 The Athenian is much 
more impressed and influenced in the Laws by the Spartan treatment 
of women. Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans:
Make your girls take part in athletics and you give them a 
compulsory education in the arts; when they grow up, though 
dispensed from working wool, they have to ‘weave’ themselves a 
pretty hard-working sort of life which is by no means despicable 
or useless…but they don’t take up military service. This means 
that even if there were some extreme emergency ever led 
to a battle for their state and the lives of their children, they 
wouldn’t have the expertise to use bows and arrows, like so 
many Amazons, nor could they join men in deploying any other 
missile.149
 
Plato, however, proposes to go farther than the Spartans, for he is 
conscious of another contemporary Greek state with military trained 
women: the Sarmatians, who Plato hopes to recreate in Magnesia. The 
Spartan women are industrious, but:
I would speak without being at all afraid of the argument that 
horseback riding and gymnastics are fitting for men, but not 
fitting for women. For I am persuaded by the ancient stories I 
have heard, and at this moment, so to speak, I know there are 
countless myriads of women around the Black Sea - women 
called Sarmatians - who are enjoined to handle not only horses, 
but the bow and the other weapons as well, in equality with 
men, and who practice them equally.150
148 Laws 805d-e.
149 Laws 806a-b.
150 Laws 805a.
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Plato’s awareness and knowledge of women’s roles in other cultures is 
essential, for it proves he was aware that women were capable when 
given an opportunity, and in the case of the Sarmatian women, they 
rival their men. Since Plato was unlikely to think Athenian women 
fundamentally or inherently different from Spartan or Sarmatian 
women, Plato would have correctly inferred that the most logical 
explanation for the Athenian housewife’s state was the way Athenian 
social institutions habituated her to be. 
Another point of scholarly controversy is the question of 
women’s role in the military. The Athenian himself wavers on how 
much military training is appropriate for women, sometimes declaring 
that women’s participation is optional and at other points that it is 
mandatory. We see an example of the former when the Athenian 
states:
When the boys and girls have reached the age of six, the sexes 
should be separated; boys should spend their days with boys 
and girls with girls. Each should attend lessons. The males 
should go to teachers of riding, archery, javelin-throwing and 
slinging-and the females too - if they are agreeable, may attend 
at any rate the lessons, especially those in the use of weapons.151 
 
Here we see a clear indication that girls should be allowed to 
participate if they wish, but they are by no means forced to do so. One 
way of understanding this passage is that the Athenian is cognizant 
151 Laws 794a.
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that the first few generations of women will be wary of military 
training, so he leaves the door open for later generations of girls who 
will see no reason not to participate. The following passage, however, 
directly contradicts the previous passage by making martial training 
necessary:
Lessons must be attended by the boys and men of the state, and 
the girls and women as well, because they too have to master 
these techniques. While still girls, they must practice every kind 
of dancing and fighting in armor, when grown women, they must 
play their own part in maneuvering, getting into battle formation 
and taking off and putting on weapons, if only to ensure that if 
it ever proves necessary for the whole army to leave the state 
and take the field abroad, so that the children and the rest of the 
population are left unprotected, the women at least will be able 
to defend them. 152
 
I contend that this passage is closer to Plato’s view, for half of the 
motivation to train women in the first place was to increase the 
military’s capacity. This passage still presents us with a further 
ambiguity when he states that women must be trained to fight in 
case the city is attacked while the army is elsewhere. One obvious 
interpretation is that women will not actively serve in the military, so 
when the male army is away, all the women in Magnesia can defend 
the city. I believe that Plato has a different picture in mind: the army 
is comprised of men and women, and the women left to defend the 
city are the women who are too young to serve, women under forty. 
Admittedly the reason women under forty are not allowed to serve is 
152 Laws 813e-814a.
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that they must focus on bearing healthy children for the state, but it 
would be nearly impossible for all the women in Magnesia to be very 
far along in their pregnancies at the same time. In theory, a certain 
proportion of the women will be too far along in their pregnancy to 
fight, but all the other women under forty can defend the city. Another 
passage which lends credibility to this theory acknowledges that 
females can be fearsome warriors when protecting their young. The 
Athenian posits a situation where Magnesia is invaded when the army 
is away. He explains the disastrous consequences for Magnesia if:
Women proved to have been so shockingly ill-educated that they 
couldn’t even rival female birds, who are prepared to run every 
risk and die for their chicks fighting against the most powerful of 
wild animals. What if instead of that, the women promptly made 
off to temples…with the disgrace of being by nature the most 
lily-livered creatures under the sun?153
 
What this statement suggests is that if women are not educated, they 
act cowardly without even showing the bravery of female birds. We are 
well aware, though, that this is not the case in Magnesia; since women 
will be educated and trained to fight, it is not difficult to surmise that 
the women under forty left to guard Magnesia will fight fiercely to 
defend their young. 
Plato then clearly believes women - and not just a select few 
- can accomplish martial feats as well as the men if they are given 
153 Laws 814
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the opportunity to learn and practice. The tasks mentioned above, 
horseback riding and handling various weapons, lend credibility to the 
argument that Plato envisaged women in Magnesia as full members of 
the army and not just in supporting roles. We also see here a critique 
of Athenian society, for if women can become warriors if given the 
opportunity, then the poor condition the Athenian housewife is in is the 
fault of Athenian society rather than any natural defect in women. The 
Athenian continues the passage above by claiming:
If, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this 
way, then the way that they are now arranged in our lands 
- where it is not the case that all the men with their entire 
strength…practice the same things as women - is the most 
mindless of all. For in this way, almost every city is just about 
half of what it might be, when with the same expenditures and 
efforts it could double itself.154
 
We must note that the Athenian declares that states like Classical 
Athens are “half” of their potential, whereas if women were trained 
equally with the men, the state’s capacities would be “doubled.” 
The choice of “half” and “double” demonstrate that Plato believes 
women’s efforts will equal and match those of the men. This is an 
important point, for some argued that the female Guardians in the 
Republic would be inferior to the male Guardians but here we have 
evidence that Plato views women’s talents to equal those of men. We 
must also bear this point in mind when it comes to Magnesia, for this 
154 Laws 805a-b.
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concept gives Plato reason and motive to have the women in Magnesia 
contribute just as much as the men.
There has been much scholarly debate on whether Plato truly 
intended the women of Magnesia to hold office. Trevor Saunders is 
correct when he states that we should not be asking if Plato meant 
for women to hold office and expect a straight yes or no answer. As 
Saunders explains, a better question is “Would he have intended it, 
once convinced it was feasible?”155 Saunders continues to argue that in 
accordance with Plato’s:
own functional and pragmatic premises, he surely would 
have regarded any state in which women hold major office 
successfully as a better state than one in which they do not. 
In Magnesia, by accident or design, he is not clear whether he 
envisages it; but he has at any rate left the door open, and 
would surely be very happy to see the Magnesians walk through 
it.156
 
I disagree with Saunders in that I do believe Plato envisages women 
holding office, but his remark brings up an interesting possibility. 
Perhaps a better way of stating Saunders’ comment is that Plato did 
not think the first female colonists or even the first few generations of 
female Magnesians would hold office. This position makes pragmatic 
sense as the first female settlers would lack the education to hold 
office, and if they found the idea of eating in public outlandish, then 
the idea of holding office would have been beyond imagination. The 
155 Saunders (1995, p. 604).
156 Saunders (1995, p. 604).
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daughters of these first settlers would have the education to hold 
office, but lingering prejudices or social views from their parents 
may dissuade them from running. By around the third generation, 
however, one can see that those young girls would see no reason 
why they should not hold office. Admittedly this transition may take 
more generations, but the chief point is that Plato did envisage women 
holding office, but he was aware that it would take time to bring this 
about. In this respect I agree with Saunders that Plato has “left the 
door open,” but I do not think Plato would have only been “very happy 
to see the Magnesians walk through it.” Instead, Plato fully expected 
women to walk through it, for a state in which women did not hold 
office is not nearly as good as a state where women did. 
IV.
One way of resolving the tension between the praise for the 
women of Magnesia and their capacities and Plato’s negative remarks 
is similar to the way we solved this problem in the Republic: when 
Plato discusses the women who have been raised in Magnesia he 
sees them as equal to the men, but when he speaks of the female 
colonizers he declares that they are secretive, crafty, etc. A good 
example of a discussion where Plato makes negative remarks on 
the female colonizers’ nature occurs as the Athenian explains that 
communal meals for women must be mandatory since they are used 
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to seclusion and will have difficulty adjusting to their new dining 
arrangements. The Athenian, knowing the female colonizers are 
habituated to seclusion asks:
How on earth are you going to avoid being laughed to scorn 
when you try to force women to take their food and drink 
in public…women have got used to a life of obscurity and 
retirement, and any attempt to force them into the open will 
provoke tremendous resistance from them.157 
 
The key point in this passage is that “women have got used to a life 
of obscurity,” so they will be habituated to protest with “tremendous 
resistance.” Not only does the Athenian believe the women will resist 
this measure, they will do so because they are inclined to be secretive 
and crafty:
On the contrast, half the human race - the female sex, the half 
which in any case is inclined to be secretive and crafty, because 
of its weakness - has been left to its own devices because of the 
misguided indulgence of the legislator. Because you neglected 
this sex, you gradually lost control of a great many things which 
would be in a far better state today if they had been regulated 
by law. You see, leaving women to do what they like is not just 
to lose half the battle (as it may seem): a woman’s natural 
potential for virtue is inferior to a man’s, so she’s proportionally 
a greater danger, perhaps even twice as much.158 
 
 Athenian wives would appear secretive to the Athenian stranger, and 
it is also possible that without as many rights or education, a woman 
in Athens would need to be cunning to get what she desired.159 More 
specifically, weakness does not always make women secretive and 
157 Laws 781d.
158 Laws 781a-b.
159 Bobonich 2004, 387.
97
 
crafty, but it inclines them to be so. If women are given educational 
and physical training, however, they will not be weak and will not 
need to resort to subterfuge. Plato does not blame the women, but the 
legislators, for by having “neglected this sex, you gradually lost 
control of a great many thing which would be in a far better state 
today if they had been regulated by law.”160 There is no doubt 
concerning the negativity of this statement, but there is reason to 
believe that women’s inferiority is a result of how they have been 
habituated, for the next line states, “So the happiness of the state will 
be better served if we reconsider the point and put things right, by 
providing that all our arrangements apply to men and women alike.”161 
It should also be remembered that the Athenian is in the midst of a 
conversation with the Cretan Clinias and the Spartan Megillus, which 
entails that the Athenian must not only persuade the reader of his 
measures, but his two companions as well. Though Clinias and 
Megillus prove themselves worthy interlocutors, they are more 
influenced by the social conventions of their time than the Athenian. 
When the Athenian therefore makes declarations such as a woman’s 
natural potential for virtue is less than a man’s, he may be framing 
the argument at a level where it is more likely to influence Clinias and 
Megillus. We have such an example at 805a-b, where after the 
160 Laws  781a.
161 Laws 781b.
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Athenian describes the impressive Sarmatian women and continues to 
declare that the current state affairs entails that a state only develops 
half its potential, Clinias responds:
A lot of these proposals, sir, are incompatible with the average 
state’s social structure. However, you were quite right when you 
said we should give the argument its head, and only make up 
our minds when it had run its course. You’ve made me reproach 
myself for having spoken.162
 
This quote indicates that even though Plato believes women are as 
good by nature as men, he must occasionally pitch the argument at 
a level which will appeal to his interlocutors’ sensibilities as to what 
is natural for women. A curious result is that even if Plato does not 
convince Clinias and Megillus that women are not by nature inferior 
to men, they will still have reason to support the Athenian’s proposals 
for women; if women are weaker and more deceitful than men, they 
are therefore potentially dangerous in secret and accordingly must 
be made to be in public. Another interpretation of woman’s natural 
potential being inferior to man’s is that this will only apply to the first 
generation of colonizers. 
We must not forget that the men and women who will 
colonize Magnesia will not be citizens who have benefited from Plato’s 
rigorous education system. Rather, they will suffer from the common 
prejudices and institutions of their time and society, so the women 
162 Laws 805a-b.
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who will colonize Magnesia may in fact be inferior to their husbands.  
Taking this into account we must imagine how the typical Athenian 
wife, accustomed to spending the majority of her time in her own 
home, would react to being told not only that she must have 
communal meals with every other female citizen of Magnesia, but that 
she also has a right to vote and hold office, and a duty to serve in the 
military. It is hard to imagine anyone not having a certain degree of 
difficulty in adjusting to this requirement. As the generations change 
their ways through the superior laws of Magnesia, the women will 
shed the characteristics which Athenian social institutions produced. 
The detailed nature of the Laws demonstrates Plato’s belief that good 
laws make good people, and by creating laws that educate women he 
believes that women will become good enough to hold office in the 
state; hardly a duty he would give to those of questionable virtue or 
nature. There is a point Plato does not make, though it would not be 
inconsistent with his views on habituation: if in a different society 
gender roles were reversed and the women were lawmakers while 
men were uneducated and idle at home, then the men would be just 
as secretive as the women of Classical Athens. 
The Athenian stranger paves the way for an argument on the 
equality of the sexes when he discusses ambidexterity and claims that 
right-handedness is not related to our nature but due to habituation. 
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The Athenian declares that habituation of this kind is wasteful for it 
unnecessarily squanders half of our natural talent.163 After discussing 
how the two sexes should be educated the Athenian states:
People think that where the hands are concerned right and left 
are by nature suited for different specialized tasks - whereas 
of course in the case of the lower limbs there is obviously no 
difference in efficiency at all. Thanks to the silly ideas of nurses 
and mothers we’ve all been made lame-handed so to speak. 
The natural potential of each arm is just about the same, and 
the difference between them is our own fault, because we’ve 
habitually misused them.164
 
If taken in the context of sex equality and education, this passage 
strongly asserts that “there is obviously no difference in efficiency 
at all,” and that habituation of this sort leads us to be “made lame-
handed so to speak.” He also asserts that the “natural potential of 
each arm,” or boy and girl, “is just about the same,” and therefore 
any difference between them is not natural but as a result of 
having “habitually misused them.”165 Such a strong argument echoes 
those of the Republic, so it is interesting to note that in the Laws 
this argument is not made explicitly in reference to sex but is placed 
after a discussion on educating the sexes. But once this Republic-like 
argument is made the Athenian pulls back. 
V.
In this section I shall turn my attention to the Timaeus, 
163 Laws 794d-795a.
164 Laws 794d-e.
165 Laws 794e Okin 1979, 61.
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where Plato makes possibly his most negative comments on women. 
Chronologically the Timaeus takes place the day after Socrates has 
given a discourse similar to that of the Republic. Socrates begins the 
dialogue by briefly recounting the discourse’s three-fold division of 
labor, the Guardians’ education, and how Guardians must search for 
the best children in order to provide them with the proper education.166 
There is no indication in Socrates’ summarization that he has revised 
his opinion on female Guardians, for Socrates states “In fact we even 
made mention of women. We said that their natures should be made 
to correspond with those of men, and that all occupations, whether 
having to do with war or with other aspects of life, should be common 
to both men and women.”167  Socrates is present for the entire 
Timaeus, but the majority of the text is a speech by Timaeus, a 
cosmology describing the origins of the world. Having spent the earlier 
part of the chapter discussing the Athenian stranger, we know we 
cannot necessarily infer anything from a change in narrator. Timaeus, 
however, differs from the Athenian in an important way: Socrates is 
present for the dialogue, so Plato’s usual mouthpiece is in attendance 
but mostly silent; the Athenian stranger, though, is Plato’s only 
spokesman in the Laws. The question, then, arises of how much of 
Timaeus’ discourse Plato subscribes to. As Cooper notes “Plato, as 
166 Timaeus 18c-e.
167 Timaeus 18c.
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author of the work, is responsible for all Timaeus’ theories,” but it is 
unclear if the theories embody Plato’s own theories.168 Cooper also 
asks us to consider the Phaedrus, where Socrates claims that speakers 
well trained in the art of rhetoric will found their speech on the truth, 
but they are prepared to alter and exaggerate their account to keep 
the listener engaged and convince him as to what the most important 
points are.169 Timaeus may be Plato’s mouthpiece, but it would be 
careless to forget the Phaedrus’s warnings on rhetoric.
Much of the literature on Plato’s views of women reference the 
Timaeus to demonstrate that despite the positive comments Plato 
makes in dialogues such as Book V of the Republic, he still retains 
the belief that women are by nature inferior to men. Indeed, the 
Timaeus is unlikely to be used a starting point in a defense of Plato 
on this topic, but it is not necessarily as negative as most believe. 
One important distinction that is commonly disregarded is that the 
Timaeus is a cosmology, an entirely different kind of text than the 
political treatises of the Republic and the Laws. These dialogues were 
concerned with women’s capacity for virtue and the quality of their 
souls whereas the Timaeus is concerned with women’s biology. This 
entails that any negative biological remarks made regarding women 
in the Timaeus do not necessarily apply to Plato’s political beliefs. 
168 Cooper 1997, 1225.
169 Cooper 1997, 1225.
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We also should not be surprised that a biological account of men and 
women will focus on their bodily and reproductive differences rather 
than concern itself with souls and virtues, for it is exactly the biological 
difference between men and women that makes reproduction possible. 
Therefore, any comments that Plato makes concerning women cannot 
be taken as evidence that he sees women’s potential for virtue as 
inferior to that of men.
Once Timaeus finishes describing the creation of men he 
states “We should go on to mention briefly how other living things 
came to be - a topic that won’t require many words. By doing this 
we’ll seem to be in better measure…so far as our words on these 
subjects are concerned.”170 This comment, however, is misleading as 
women are vital for human reproduction and especially important in 
this cosmology as all animals in one matter or another descend from 
humans.171 Though Timaeus does not spare many words on women, 
those he does are possibly the most pejorative in the Platonic 
cannon: “All male-born humans who lived lives of cowardice or 
injustice were reborn in the second generation as women.”172 Besides 
the brevity of this statement, one striking feature is that there is no 
explanation of how the second generation of humans was born. 
170 Timaeus 90e.
171 Tinaeus 91d-92c.
172 Timaeus 91a.
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Without any women the logistics are puzzling. More important than 
the pragmatic difficulties of a second generation of humans produced 
without women, is the fact that all women are by nature inferior to 
men. If all women were cowardly or unjust men in their previous life, 
then it is impossible for a soul in a woman’s body to be as virtuous as 
a soul in a man’s body. Curiously there is no mention of whether a 
woman might be able to change her lot. Take for example a woman 
lived a just and good life; could she “upgrade” to a man’s body in the 
next life? It is unfortunate that this is cosmological discourse at this 
point, for if it were political it is likely Plato would have provided an 
explanation for how such an “upgrade” could be achieved as the 
Timaeus appears to allow them.
The most famous association of women and the Timaeus is their 
being second-generation cowardly men, but the second is not a 
discussion of women directly, but of the “receptacle.” The receptacle 
enters the dialogue when Timaeus begins his second account of the 
creation of the world. Concerning Timaeus’ previous endeavor, he 
admits:
I couldn’t convince even myself that I could be right to commit 
myself to undertaking a task of such magnitude. I shall keep 
to…likely accounts, and so shall try right from the start to say 
about things…what is no less likely…than what I have said 
before.173 
 
173 Timaeus 48d.
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Although this statement occurs before describing the receptacle, we 
must remember that even his account of second-generation women is 
also therefore only “likely,” though this likeliness is due to the vague 
nature of cosmology. Also of note is that though “likely” is less definite 
than “certain,” a “likely” account still contains reasons for it to be 
believed to be true. Yet, Timaeus is not as convinced that women are 
second-generation cowardly men as Socrates is when he states that 
women are capable of becoming Guardians; this is of course unfair to 
Timaeus as Socrates’ subject matter allows a greater degree of 
certainty whereas Timaeus’ does not. On this train of thought, 
however, it is permissible to think that Timaeus does not rule out that 
females occurred in the first generation and not only as returning 
cowardly men. If we look at a few words before that passage we see 
that Timaeus states “According to our likely account, all male-born 
humans who lived lives of cowardice or injustice were reborn in the 
second generation as women.”174 Clearly this is also another “likely” 
account, but more importantly, it does not explicitly preclude the 
existence of first generation women. If first generation women did 
exist, it would dissolve the mystery of how a second generation could 
be born if there were no women in the first. It easy to assume why 
one would suppose women are precluded, but the text does not 
174 Timaeus 91a.
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definitively state so. The obvious objection to this argument is that if 
there were first generation women, why make the cowardly first 
generation men women in the next? One possible answer I will explore 
is that this is not a political text, so when it discusses women it is 
doing so from a fully biological perspective. 
As Timaeus does not directly critique women’s nature, it is 
possible to assume that the reason why becoming a woman is a 
punishment is due to biology as well; more specifically, the biological 
discomfort associated with giving birth and other hormonal aspects 
such as menstruation and menopause. It is clear that Timaeus is 
aware that certain aspects of women’s biology are unpleasant, for 
when he discusses reproduction he states that:
A woman’s womb or uterus, as it is called, is a living thing 
within her with a desire for childbearing. Now when this remains 
unfruitful for an unseasonably long period of time, it is extremely 
frustrated and travels everywhere up and down her body. It 
blocks up her respiratory passages, and by not allowing her to 
breathe it throws her into extreme emergencies, and visits all 
sorts of other illnesses upon her until finally the woman’s desire 
and the man’s love brings them together.175
 
The biological process of hysteria that Timaeus references, it does not 
seem an enjoyable one.176 It is therefore possible that the demotion 
to a woman has to do with biology rather than nature. If this is true, 
175 Timaeus 91c.
176 As was noted earlier and as was discussed earlier in this chapter, women had no control over how 
and when they became pregnant so it is not difficult to imagine a man wishing to avoid upwards of ten 
pregnancies; pregnancies which often lead to the mother’s death.
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then it ties in with the concept of women upgrading and becoming a 
man in the next generation, for if she lived virtuously she would avoid 
the biological discomforts of being a woman in her next life. Timaeus 
also has an opportunity to criticize women when he discusses how 
various animals descend from flawed humans, but instead of stating 
that animals derive from flawed women, they all descend from flawed 
men.177
To return to the receptacle, Timaeus revises his previous claim 
that the universe had two kinds to say that there are now three. 
The first kind “was proposed as a model, intelligible and always 
changeless,” and the second kind was “an imitation of the model, 
something that possesses becoming and is visible.”178 The new addition 
of the third kind is in Timaeus’ own words “difficult and vague,” and he 
defines it as “a receptacle of all becoming - its wetnurse, as it were.”179 
After a failed attempt at describing its nature he tries again by taking 
the example of gold which can be melted into any shape. Timaeus 
states that if one saw a gold triangle and asked what it was, it would 
be incorrect to say “triangle” for the shape can change, but if one 
says “gold” one will have grasped its unchanging nature.180 Timaeus 
continues:
177 Timaeus 91d-92b.
178 Timaeus 49a.
179 Timaeus 49a.
180 Timaeus 50b.
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Now the same account…holds also for nature which receives 
all the bodies. We must always refer to it by the same term, 
for it does not depart from its own character in any way. Not 
only does it always receive all things, it has never in any way 
whatever taken on any characteristic similar to any of the things 
that enter it. Its nature is to be available for anything to make 
its impression upon…These are the things that make it appear 
different at different times. The things that enter and leave it are 
imitations of those things that always are, imprinted after their 
likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe.181
 
We clearly have a woman-type figure in the receptacle, but it is 
difficult to say whether one can garner a position on women from it. 
Plato describes the three eide of Timaeus’ second account as “that 
which is generated, and that in which it is generated, and that 
of which what was generated is a naturally derived resemblance. 
What is generated may be likened to a child and what harbors it 
may be likened to the womb of a mother.”182 It would appear that 
the receptacle functions in a reproductive sense and is viewed as 
necessary and positive. Timaeus explains the receptacle’s importance 
in the universe when he states:
We shouldn’t call the mother or receptacle of what has come 
to be, of what is visible or perceivable in every other way, 
either earth or air, fire or water, or any of their compounds 
or their constituents. But if we speak of it as an invisible and 
characterless sort of thing, one that receives all things and 
shares in a most perplexing way in what is intelligible, a thing 
extremely difficult to comprehend, we shall not be misled.183
 
The receptacle itself seems neutral, but it is a necessary, perhaps 
181 Timaeus 50b-c.
182 Timaeus 50c-d.
183 Timaeus  51a-b.
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catalyzing, component in the universe. Though we are unclear as to 
how the receptacle actually interacts with what it receives and shares, 
it clearly plays a vital role. The receptacle is indeed perplexing, but 
what is important for our purpose is that it is not inherently negative. 
VI.
In this chapter I hope to have demonstrated that despite the 
return of the family and private property in the Laws, there is no 
reason to think either that Plato has changed his view of women’s 
nature, or that he permits any sex-based discrimination. To do so 
would be unjust, and the only injustice he is allowed to admit in terms 
of the family is private attachments. We must also remember that any 
negative comments concerning women’s nature reference the female 
colonizers, but that within a few generations the good laws of 
Magnesia will re-habituate the women so these remarks are no longer 
accurate. 
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Chapter Four
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the painter Raphael’s The Schools of Athens, Plato is 
portrayed as pointing up towards the heavens representing his belief 
in the Forms whereas Aristotle gestures to the earth, representing his 
belief that knowledge is gained from empirical observation and 
experience. The differences in Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies are 
of course far more complex than The Schools of Athens portrays, but 
in fact it broadly captures a main distinction in their approach to 
philosophy. Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophies are more connected 
than almost any other pair of philosophers, for Aristotle was Plato’s 
student at his Academy for nearly twenty years. Perhaps Aristotle’s 
greatest departure from the Platonic tradition is a rejection of Plato’s 
Forms and his replacement of them with observable particulars. For 
Plato, one could look at a bed, but this bed derived its “bedness” from 
the universal Form of Bed. The Form of Bed was intangible, invisible, 
and immortal, so any bed observed by the human eye was a lesser 
form of Bed. Aristotle, however, had his own different theory of the 
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Forms and argued that the universal quality of a thing existed in its 
physical manifestation; if Aristotle looked at a bed, he would contend 
that the universal existed not only in the bed in front of him, but also 
in every manifestation of a bed. This is a dramatically simplified 
account, but the point to grasp is that Plato does not think knowledge 
and truth can be observed in the physical world and therefore 
discounts empirical observations, while Aristotle believes truth can be 
derived from observation and experience. Their methods will have 
implications for what each deems the appropriate role for women in 
society. Plato is able to conclude a woman should not be excluded 
from any role in virtue of her sex since one’s true nature resides in a 
soul which cannot be observed. Aristotle however, forms his views of 
women based on observations and therefore cannot escape tying his 
theory to the Classical Athenian women he observes. 
Plato and Aristotle have differing views on women for many 
reasons, but perhaps the most significant distinction is that Plato 
thought that since the only difference between good men and women 
was that “the females bear children while the males beget them, we’ll 
say that there has been no kind of proof that women are different 
from men.”184 According to Aristotle, however, the relation of men 
and women is that of ruler and ruled, men and women have distinct 
184Republic  454e 
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virtues due to their distinct functions, although women have the 
capacity to deliberate their reason lacks authority, and while a man 
can possess practical intelligence the most a woman can achieve is 
true opinion.185  Aristotle’s ethical theory makes theoretical reasoning 
necessary in order to achieve true human excellence, since “reason 
more than anything else is man.”186 This concept combined with 
Aristotle’s account of women’s nature, which he characterizes as a 
defective capacity for rationality,187 creates an ethical theory that 
excludes women from ever achieving human excellence. His political 
theory carries a similar sentiment in that he writes “some should rule 
and others be ruled, is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from 
the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for 
rule.”188 Though Plato has similar thoughts, his are based on one’s soul 
rather than one’s sex.
Aristotle’s negative conclusions concerning women’s capacities 
are surprising considering he knew of impressive women such as 
Aspasia and knew Plato’s arguments in Book V of the Republic, even 
if Aristotle disagreed with them. Aristotle was Macedonian rather 
than Athenian, but he was likely aware of women’s role in religion, of 
wise women such as Diotima, and that the city of Athens is named 
185 Pol. 1.13, 3.4.1277b24-29, NE 8.7.1158b11-28, 8.11.1161a22-25, Rhet. 1.5.1361a4-16.
186 NE. 10.7.1178a7-8.
187 NE. 8.9.1160b32-37, Pol. 1.5. 1254b12-15.
188 Pol. 1.5.1254a21-23.
113
 
after Athena, goddess of wisdom. Plato’s observations lead him to 
conclude that the poor state of Athenian women is due to habituation 
and Athenian social institutions, but he recognizes that better laws 
will produce good women. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not aim to 
create the ideal state nor radically alter society, but one wonders 
how he could not attribute even a degree of blame on Athenian social 
institutions, particularly since like Plato he knew women in other 
cultures labored to their benefit. In the Generation of Animals he 
writes of women experiencing discomfort during pregnancy:
Their way of life is partly responsible for this, for being sedentary 
they are full of more residual matter; among nations where the 
women live a laborious life gestation is not equally conspicuous 
and those who are accustomed to hard work bear children easily 
both there and elsewhere; for work consumes the residual 
matter, but those who are sedentary have a great deal of it in 
them because not only is there no monthly discharge during 
pregnancy but also they do not work; therefore their travail is 
painful. But work exercises them so that they can hold their 
breath, upon which depends the ease or difficulty of child-
birth.189 
 
This passage presents many questions for Aristotle for if he knows 
some women “live a laborious life,” then how can he claim as he 
does in the History of Animals that women are soft and unable to 
withstand levels of pain that men can?190 Given that Aristotle is aware 
that exercise benefits women one expects him to advocate at least 
moderate exercise and a less sedentary lifestyle for Athenian women, 
189 GA 4.6.775a30-b2.
190 HA 9.1.608b1.
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but he instead argues women are by nature intended to remain 
within the home.191 It appears Aristotle determined that the traits of 
Classical Athenian women are the traits characteristic of women by 
nature; rather than concluding Athenian women are softer and less 
spirited than Athenian men, Aristotle applied this observation to all 
women. Mayhew argues Aristotle “seems simply to take the Greek 
social structure as what is natural” rather than as a social structure.192 
Although Aristotle presumes Athens is superior to its neighbors, this 
claim should not lead to the conclusion that Athenian society is closer 
to nature than any other state; while Aristotle can claim Athenian 
society is superior to all other societies, this does not entail that 
Athenian society is natural and best.193 
In addition to the above assumption, Aristotle’s consciousness of 
popular opinion may have prevented him from questioning Athenian 
society too harshly.  In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:
We must, as in all other cases, set up the apparent facts before 
us and, after first discussing the difficulties, go on to prove, 
if possible, the truth of all the common opinions about these 
affections of the mind, or, failing this, of the greater number and 
the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the difficulties and 
leave the common opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved 
the case sufficiently.194
 
191 Econ. 1.3.1343b7-1344a8.
192 Mayhew 2004, 112.
193 Mayhew 2004, 113.
194NE 1145b3-10. We must be careful, however, not to take this passage to indicate that Aristotle always 
aimed to uphold common opinions. Rather, he was conscious that common opinion often contained a grain 
of truth. 
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Here we see another distinction between Plato and Aristotle: Plato 
views the public as corrupting and incompatible with philosophy 
whereas Aristotle seeks to find the best of popular opinion. Plato states 
his opinion of the multitude when he writes:
The members of the small group have tasted how sweet and 
blessed a possession of philosophy is, and at the same time 
they’ve also seen the madness of the majority and realized…that 
hardly anyone acts sanely in public affairs and that there is 
no ally with whom they might go to the aid of justice and 
survive…just like a man who has fallen among wild animals…nor 
sufficiently strong to oppose the general savagery alone.195 
 
Plato has reason to distrust common opinion in that it was the decision 
of the many to sentence Socrates to death on charges of impiety, 
and partly from this disdain stems his ability to see beyond the 
conventions of his time. Plato had no motive to assume that women’s 
role in Athens was best and natural and was therefore able to allow his 
philosophy to dictate what role women should serve in the state. With 
Aristotle’s concern for maintaining common opinion if possible, he had 
motive to argue against any radical shift in women’s positions. I do 
not mean to suggest that Aristotle thought women were more capable 
than common opinion allowed but remained silent in order to avoid 
controversy - rather, Aristotle genuinely believed women’s natural 
place in society was within the domestic sphere and therefore had no 
reason to advocate a drastic and difficult-to-implement theory. 
195 Republic 496c-d.
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Aristotle’s remarks on women’s nature and women’s biology 
have received a great deal of attention as well as criticism, but far less 
attention has been focused on women’s actual role within society. This 
is not surprising as he provides little information on women’s ideal 
duties and capacities, but by looking at texts that center on the home 
such as the Economics196 we learn that Aristotle views women as 
essential parts of his society, not merely for their reproductive 
capacities but for the partnership they form with their husbands.
I.
 
In addition to the physical distinctions Aristotle observes 
between men and women, he also asserts that women are 
psychologically different from men. Aristotle presents his perceived 
differences in character and cognition in the History of Animals. The 
passage that best demonstrates this, HA 9.1.608a21-b18, is long so I 
shall only reproduce the most pertinent sections:
In all genera in which the distinction of male and female 
is found, nature makes a similar differentiation in the 
characteristics of the two sexes. This differentiation is the most 
obvious in the case of human kind and in that of the larger 
animals and the viviparous quadrupeds. For the female is 
softer in character, is the sooner tamed, admits more readily of 
caressing, is more apt in the way of learning; as, for instance, 
in the Laconian breed of dogs the female is cleverer  than the 
male…
 
In all cases, excepting those of the bear and the leopard, the 
female is less spirited than the male; in regard to the two 
196 It is possible that this text was not written by Aristotle but by one of his students. Even if this is not by 
Aristotle’s own hand it almost certainly reflects his views.
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exceptional cases, the superiority in courage rests with the 
female. With all other animals the female is softer in disposition, 
is more mischievous, less simple, more impulsive, and more 
attentive to the nurture of the young; the male on the other 
hand, is more spirited, more savage, more simple and less 
cunning. The traces of these characteristics are more or less 
visible everywhere, but they are especially visible where 
character is the more developed, and most of all in man. The 
fact is, the nature of man is the most rounded off and complete, 
and consequently in man the qualities above referred to are 
found most clearly. Hence woman is more compassionate than 
man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more 
jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She 
is, furthermore, more prone to despondency and less hopeful 
than the man, more void of shame, more false of speech, more 
deceptive, and of more retentive memory. She is also more 
wakeful, more shrinking, more difficult to rouse to action, and 
requires a smaller quantity of nutriment. As was previously 
stated, the male is more courageous than the female, and more 
sympathetic in the way of standing by to help. Even in the case 
of cephalopods, when the cuttlefish is struck with the trident the 
male stands by to help the female; but when the male is struck 
the female runs away.
 
Two of the qualities ascribed to females are of particular importance: 
women are softer and less spirited than men. These two essential 
qualities appear to lead to, or at least have a connection with, 
women’s cognitive and character traits.197 In the HA passage softness 
refers to one’s ability to manage pleasure and pain.198 Softness relates 
to bodily pleasures and physical comfort (NE 7.4.1148a11-13, Rhet 
1.10 1368b18), but primarily relates to one’s incapacity to endure 
physical pain and discomfort that most could if forced:
Now the man who is defective in respect of resistance to the 
things which most men both resist and resist successfully is soft 
197 Mayhew 2004, 93.
198 NE 7.4.1147b21-23.
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and effeminate; for effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a 
man trails his cloak to avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the 
invalid without thinking himself wretched…But it is surprising 
if a man is defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains 
which most men can hold out against, when this is not due to 
hereditary or disease, like the softness that is hereditary with 
the kings of the Scythians, or that distinguishes the female sex 
from the male. (NE 7.7.1150b1-5, b12-16)
 
 Softness in a woman cannot be considered a virtue or a vice 
(NE 7.1.1145a35-b2) whereas softness in an average male is 
blameworthy, for his softness is the result of active deliberation.199 
Softness in women as well as in men who are inherently effeminate 
or ill is not deemed a moral flaw for they are soft by nature. Though 
women cannot be blamed for their softness, it does lead them to 
disproportionately value and desire appetitive goods. We should not 
attach too much importance to softness, however, for softness is a 
specific trait and Aristotle himself makes the point in the Eudemian 
Ethics that is possible for a man to face death bravely while being 
easily affected by extremes in temperature.200 
In addition to their softness, Aristotle asserts that women’s souls 
are less forceful than male souls. Women’s lack of spirit entails that 
they are less emotional in regard to emotions connected to “spirit”201 
rather than less emotional in regard to the appetites.202 According to 
199 Mayhew 2004, 99.
200 EE 3.1,1229b1-8.
201 Such as “courage” or “temperance.” 
202 Mayhew 2004, 100.
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Aristotle, women’s softness directly relates to their lack of spirit: a 
woman’s desire for appetitive pleasure cannot be checked by her weak 
spirit. Less spirit corresponds with Aristotle’s other claims such as 
women are cowardly, unlikely to aid another in trouble,203 tend to lie, 
and are disingenuous.204 In the Rhetoric Aristotle claims that the 
spirited are passionate, quick to act, truthful, and candid whereas the 
less spirited will reflect upon an event and fabricate a story;205 when a 
man angers he reacts without delay, but when a woman angers she 
mulls over the event and conspires for revenge. One’s degree of spirit 
affects how one controls the appetites, for in the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle asserts:
[A] passionate man is not given to plotting, nor is anger 
itself - it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated 
by what the poets call Aphrodite, ‘guile-weaving daughter 
of Cyprus’…Therefore if this form of incontinence is more 
unjust and disgraceful than that in respect of anger, it is both 
incontinence without qualification and in a sense vice.206 
 
 From this evidence Mayhew concludes that Aristotle judges women 
as susceptible to bodily pleasures and schemers who act deceitfully 
to satisfy their appetites and evade pain.207 One cannot easily avoid 
the conclusion that women by nature have inferior natures than men. 
Instead of blaming women for their lesser nature, however, Aristotle 
203 HA 608a33-35, b14-18.
204HA 9.1.608b12. 
205 Rhetoric 1.9.1367a38.
206 NE 7.6.1149b1-18.
207 Mayhew 2004, 101-102.
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assumes women are so by nature and therefore unable to be better. 
Although women are not faulted for their nature, inherent qualities 
such as impulsiveness208 compromise a woman’s capacity to act 
morally; if one acts impulsively one has deliberated on the best course 
of action but does not follow through due to appetites.209 
Additional traits discussed in the History of Animals passage 
are women’s jealousy, complaints, and tendency to fight.210 Jealousy 
and a tendency to fight could indicate a strong spirit, but in context it 
likely refers to envying material goods, fighting over trivial matters, 
and scolding, while a predisposition to complain correlates to women’s 
softness. Aristotle writes “the female is softer in character, is the 
sooner tamed, admits more readily of caressing, is more apt in 
the way of learning,”211 but the praise in this statement relates to 
domestication and how one handles animals, entailing that women are 
more easily trained and tamed than men.212 Furthermore, the passage 
begins by discussing women’s softness and lack of spirit, and since 
animals with less spirit are more easily trained and animals with less 
control of their appetites require training, it implies women are by 
nature suited to learn domestic duties.
208 An additional result of softness. HA 9.1.608b1-2.
209 Mayhew 2004, 102. NE 7.7.1150b19-21.
210 9.1.608b8-11.
211 608a25-28.
212 608b3.
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When Aristotle claims women are less simple he does not refer 
to human intelligence but to the kind of low-level cognition found in 
some animals, and to a degree, in humans. He also states that women 
have a superior memory, but the context indicates that women have a 
better memory for perceived insults: “She is, furthermore, more prone 
to despondency and less hopeful than the man, more void of shame, 
more false of speech, more deceptive, and of more retentive 
memory.”213 In the initial passage, Aristotle discusses the natural 
characteristics that certain animals as well as humans are born with, 
but we must not confuse these with the traditional human virtues that 
belong only to humans. Lennox argues that according to 
Aristotle, “humans begin life with the very natural capacities that are 
the beast’s likeness of bravery, temperance, understanding, or 
intelligence, yet end up with quite different learned and acquired 
states, namely true bravery and intelligence.”214 When Aristotle makes 
the positive-sounding claim that women feel more pity, mercy, and 
compassion it should be noted that these emotions are related to 
women’s tendency to cry and a lack of spirit.215 Although feeling pity 
correctly deserves praise, it is unlikely women experience pity 
appropriately. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:
[B]oth fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity 
213 608b11-13.
214 Lennox 1999a, 18.
215 9.1.608b8-9, NE 2.5.1105b21-25.
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and in general pleasure and pain may be felt too much and too 
little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right 
times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right 
people, with the right aim, and in the right way, is what is both 
intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of excellence.216 
 
Clearly the way one feels pity is not only specific but requires 
knowledge and sensitivity as to what is too much pity and what is 
too little. Women therefore feel pity to a higher degree than a man 
should, but unlike feeling too much anger or fear, feeling pity acutely 
does not affect anyone negatively, excepting the woman experiencing 
the pity. Though declaring that women are more compassionate is 
praise, this praise is used to set up her negative traits: “Hence woman 
is more compassionate than man, more easily moved to tears, at the 
same time is more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to 
strike.”217 Though feeling a greater degree of compassion is still praise, 
the fact that it is used to illustrate women’s truculent nature makes 
the compassion seem less important.
II.
One of the many departures from Plato’s philosophy is Aristotle’s 
perception of emotions which lead him to form a new conception of 
human psychology.218 Understanding that the emotions can be 
persuaded by reason, Aristotle significantly changes his ethical theory 
216 2.6.1106b19.
217 608b8-11.
218 As opposed to Plato’s tripartite psychology.
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which results in a more thorough consideration of women’s 
subordinate role in the state.  Aristotle concurred with Plato that one’s 
role in society should be determined by one’s nature, entailing that 
different natures therefore require different roles,219 while also 
concurring with Gorgias that women and slaves have distinct virtues 
from men due to their different roles in society.220 Aristotle examines 
women’s role in society and the virtues suited to their domestic role221 
and concludes that not only do women require less courage than 
men,222 but that “the temperance of a man and of a woman, or the 
courage and justice of a man and a woman, are not, as Socrates 
maintained, the same; the courage of a man is shown in commanding, 
of a woman in obeying.”223 If, as Aristotle asserts, the sexes have 
distinct virtues, women are by nature intended to occupy different 
roles than men, whereas Plato maintains there are no specifically male 
or female virtues. Plato and Aristotle both compare men and women’s 
physical conditions and conclude that women are physically weaker, 
but while Plato attaches little importance to the distinction, Aristotle 
understands women’s physical weakness as an indication that they are 
meant to occupy a domestic role.
219 Pol. 1.13.1260b27-28.
220 Pol. 1260a15-17.
221 Pol. 1.13.1260a16-17.
222 Pol. 3.4.1277b20-2.
223 Pol. 1.13.1260a20-24.
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The concept of proper virtues for different categories of people in 
society with the principle that virtue is related to function is important, 
but the true question occurs on a more essential level: why do 
different categories of people have distinct roles in the state?224 The 
answer lies in observing how Aristotle’s new bipartite psychology and 
the ability to deliberate leads to differences in the souls of the sexes. 
Aristotle explains the relationship between husband and wife as ruler 
to subject and writes: 
Here the very constitution of the soul has shown us the way; 
in it one part naturally rules, and the other is subject, and the 
excellence of the ruler we maintain to be different from that of 
the subject - the one being the excellence of the rational, and 
the other of the irrational part.225 
 
Men therefore naturally rule women due to the rationality of men’s 
souls and the irrationality of women’s souls. Aristotle continues: 
[T]he slave has no deliberative faculty at all; the woman has, 
but it is without authority, and the child has, but it is immature. 
So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the excellences 
of character also; all should partake of them, but only in such 
manner and degree as is required by each for the fulfillment of 
his function. 226
 
Women are thus comparable to slaves and children in that none have 
control over their deliberative capacity. Women, however, significantly 
differ from slaves and children in that women’s deliberative capacity 
is not in someway defective, as are the others; instead, women’s 
224 Fortenbaugh 1975, 138.
225 Pol. 1.13.1260a4-7.
226 Pol. 1.13.1260a14-17.
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capacity to deliberate is akuron, meaning it lacks authority and is often 
overruled by emotions and appetites. Although women’s major flaw 
are of a volitional nature, this flaw is not as significant as an inability 
to reason due to the extreme importance Aristotle places on one’s 
deliberative capacity. Rather than base decisions on reason women 
are directed by pleasure, in need of temperance, and ill-suited for any 
position of responsibility in society.  
Women’s functioning ability to deliberate is often over shadowed 
by the claim that women cannot achieve human excellence, but the 
essential point to grasp is that this is due to the strength of their 
emotions rather than a flaw in their reasoning. According to Aristotle, 
women are intelligent, capable of deliberation, and of giving logical 
advice, so it is not that women cannot deliberate logically, but that 
emotions are likely to overpower their deliberations.227 Proof of his 
recognition of female intelligence is that it is in virtue of their 
intelligence that they differ from slaves, who have no reason 
whatsoever, and children who have reason but use it imperfectly. 
Euripides’ Medea demonstrates not only Aristotle’s conception of how 
the emotions overrule reason, but the way Classical Athenians 
perceived women and how they were portrayed in literature. Medea, 
angered that her husband Jason has abandoned her for another 
227 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139.  Fortenbaugh notes that this view of women was common in the literature of 
the time. 139
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woman, plots to take her revenge by murdering her children fathered 
by Jason. Upon deliberation, Medea accepts that killing her own 
children for revenge is not a proportional response and would greatly 
pain her as well. Although Medea does indeed waver after deliberating 
the consequences of her actions, her reason cannot exert the required 
authority to enable her to follow through with her deliberations and 
she murders her children.228 Aristotle clearly sees defects in women’s 
ability to control their passions, but he does not fault their actual 
capacity to reason; just because a woman acts unreasonably and 
emotionally does not entail that she is incapable of producing 
intelligent thought. As Fortenbaugh notes229 however, Aristotle’s 
evidence of women’s acumen was due to the belief that “Women are 
most clever contrivers of every evil.”230 Aristotle likely assumes women 
turn their deliberations towards an end that is motivated by their 
emotions, so like Medea, women recognize that what they are about 
to do is wrong but are not dissuaded by this recognition.231 
Although Aristotle’s conclusions about women have led many to 
claim he was blinded by prejudice or was a flawed but eager biologist -
and to a certain degree both claims may be true - Aristotle’s views are 
in fact the result of his new conception of the soul in combination with 
228 Euripides, Medea 285, 1079.
229 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139.
230 Euripides Meadea 409
231 Fortenbaugh 1994, 139.
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Plato’s distinction that one’s nature should determine one’s role in 
society. A point where Aristotle departs from Plato is that, where Plato 
argues people should be judged according to their nature only in the 
ideal city, Aristotle seeks to apply this in his own society. The fact that 
citizens are not judged by their nature in the Laws indicates that 
organizing society by nature requires factors such as good laws and 
wise rulers. This is unsurprising for in order for one to judge the 
caliber of another’s soul, one must have knowledge of what comprises 
a superior soul as compared to an inferior soul. Only Guardians would 
be capable of making such distinctions and appropriate judgments and 
if Guardians only exist in the ideal city, then it is not surprising that 
Plato does not envisage people being given roles in society based on 
their nature anywhere else. It is unclear if Aristotle understood the 
implications of assigning roles in the state based on contemporary 
laws which are subject to the prejudices of the time, for as noted in 
the introduction, Aristotle does not account for the fact that the way 
Classical Athenian society is structured is not in fact closest to nature. 
Where Plato saw how failings in the law led to the less than impressive 
women in Athens, Aristotle assumed that women were by nature 
inferior. This assumption is curious for two reasons: the first being 
that as a student of Plato, Aristotle would at least be aware that there 
was a school of thought that believed women had been habituated by 
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laws and social institutions into their current situation, and second 
that Aristotle himself set great store in the power of habituation to 
create moral men. Aristotle writes:
[I]ntellectual excellence in the main owes both its birth and its 
growing to teaching (for which reason it requires experience 
and time), while moral excellence  comes about as a result 
of habit…From this it is also plain that none of the moral 
excellences arises in us by nature…This is confirmed by what 
happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by 
forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator; 
and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this 
that a good constitution differs from a bad one.232 
 
This statement demonstrates that Aristotle relies on the power 
of the state and habituation to create good citizens, but by not 
acknowledging the possibility that the current laws and social 
institutions had habituated Athenian women to be as they are, he fails 
to appreciate that women could be habituated differently. This passage 
is reminiscent of the Laws where Plato writes:
If, indeed, it is possible for these things to turn out this way, 
then the way that they are now arranged in our lands - where 
it is not the case that all the men…practice the same things as 
women - is the most mindless of all. For in this way, almost 
every city is just about half of what it might be, when the same 
expenditures and efforts it could double itself.233
 
Both quotes recognize that the state has the duty and the 
responsibility to make good citizens, but more importantly both quotes 
indicate that both philosophers believe good laws and habituation 
232 NE 2.1.1103a14-b2.
233 Laws 805a-b.
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can accomplish this. Even though Aristotle neither appears to have 
considered whether women in Classical Athens were inferior to men 
by nature or because they have been formed this way by the state, 
nor had any wish to introduce a theory of radical political change, it is 
unfair to state that Aristotle would have kept his negative opinion of 
women if he had had the thought that women could be habituated to 
become good. 
Of course, on Aristotle’s view, the clear impediment towards 
habituating women differently is that no matter how many changes 
are made, women are still psychologically different from and inferior 
to men. Though Aristotle may have viewed some changes in 
habituation as beneficial for women, there would be little reason to 
put too much store in habituation. If the main psychological distinction 
between men and women is that women’s reason is akuron, then to a 
degree they cannot be easily habituated. Aristotle recognizes that 
moral excellence does not arise naturally in anyone, but it appears 
that due to women’s incapacity to control their emotions and resist 
pleasure, habituating them to experience their emotions appropriately 
and temperance would go against their fundamental nature. 
III.
This section discusses women’s excellences, but before doing 
so one should note that according to Aristotle a society is only truly 
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happy if its women are happy as well. Aristotle asserts that in states 
where the women are unhappy, the entire state can only achieve half-
happiness in society:
Both male and female are here included; the excellences of the 
latter are, in body, beauty and stature, in soul, self-command 
and an industry that is not sordid. Communities as well as 
individuals should lack none of these perfections, in their women 
as well as their men. Where, as among the Lacedaemonians, the 
state of women is bad, almost half of them are not happy.234 
 
Unlike Plato, Aristotle places value upon individuals’ happiness and 
deems that women’s happiness is of benefit to the entire state. It 
is unfair though to judge Plato harshly on this point as Plato had no 
concern for the happiness of any individual or individual group. What 
is perhaps more noteworthy, however, are the traits that comprise 
women’s excellences. Aristotle does not specifically prescribe how 
the first, bodily, excellences - stature and beauty - can be achieved 
but a strong possibility is through moderate exercise. As noted 
earlier, Aristotle recognizes that women who perform physical labor 
experience an easier pregnancy and childbirth, making this excellence 
practical for women’s health and well-being. Aristotle does not 
advocate strenuous physical labor for women, but appreciates that 
moderate exercise which leads to a good stature provides many 
benefits for all. Further reason to assume that when Aristotle mentions 
the excellence of stature he envisages women engaging in moderate 
234 Rhet 1.5.1361a6-12.
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exercise is that he advocates exercise during pregnancy. In a passage 
in the Politics reminiscent of the Laws, Aristotle writes:
Women who are with child should take care of themselves; they 
should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The first of 
these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by 
requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where 
they can worship the gods who preside over birth. Their minds, 
however, unlike their bodies, they ought to keep quiet, for the 
offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do 
from the earth.235 
 
Given the problem of ‘residual matter’ that results from a sedentary 
lifestyle, presumably Aristotle would want women who were not 
pregnant to take moderate exercise as well. Arguing that women 
should take daily walks, pregnant or otherwise, does not necessarily 
contradict Aristotle’s position that women belong in the domestic 
sphere. One possible interpretation is that whilst nature intended 
women to remain in the home, he recognizes that even Classical 
Athenian women would profit from taking walks. Walking, however, 
necessarily entails leaving the home, something wealthy Athenian 
wives only did for occasions such as religious festivals and funerals.236 
Suggesting women take daily walks therefore demonstrates that 
Aristotle is prepared to propose at least minor changes to the status 
quo when appropriate.
The excellence of women’s souls, self-command, appears at 
235 Pol. 7.16.1335b13-19.
236 Pomeroy 1976, 71.
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odds with Aristotle’s writings in the Politics where he states that 
women’s deliberations are akuron. Admittedly, self-command is a 
virtue of the soul whereas deliberation is connected to one’s capacity 
for reasoning, so one must be careful before claiming that these 
positions are contradictory. Yet, how can Aristotle claim that women’s 
excellence of soul is self-command be at least reconciled with his belief 
that women’s deliberations are akuron? There does not appear to be 
a simple resolution to this question. One option is that in the Politics 
Aristotle consciously defends the current social structure of Classical 
Athens and is therefore more persuaded by the popular sentiment that 
women cannot control their emotions. Another option is that when 
discussing the deliberative capacities of slaves, women, and children, 
he observes his contemporary society and to explain why each 
occupies the role in society that one does. In the Rhetoric passage, 
however, he describes women’s excellences not specifically referencing 
Athens. 
Regardless of how one understands that women have self-
command and a deliberative capacity that is akuron, the important 
fact is that Aristotle credits women with having the ability to command 
their souls. Although self-command is an excellence and not an 
inherent quality, the fact that women can achieve self-command 
entails that Aristotle recognizes that women have more control of their 
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soul, or should at least aim to, than he acknowledges in the Politics. 
One could object, though this objection would be weak, that self-
command is an excellence that either women cannot achieve and can 
only aim for, or that only exceptional women will attain this excellence. 
This objection would be weak as, firstly, there is little sense in 
mentioning an excellence that cannot be achieved, and secondly, 
excellences are not easily achieved by women or men; the nature of 
an excellence is such that only the best people shall achieve them. It is 
unclear exactly how women’s self-command affects their role in society 
if one only looks at the Politics, but as the next section shall discuss 
there are other texts such as the Economics which portray women’s 
role in society as vital and requiring self-command.
Even should women have self-command, however, it still 
remains that Aristotle deems it necessary for husbands to govern their 
wives:
Of household management we have seen that there are three 
parts - one is the rule of a master over slaves, which has 
been discussed already, another of a father, and the third of a 
husband. A husband and father, we saw, rules over wife and 
children, both free, but the rule differs, the rule over children 
being a royal, over his wife a constitutional rule. For although 
there may be exceptions to the order of nature, the male is by 
nature fitter for command than the female, just as the elder and 
full-grown is superior to the younger and more immature.237 
 
The fact that children and women are governed differently, however, 
237 Pol.1.12.1259a37-b4.
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suggests that the relation between men and women in the home 
is in fact more nuanced than many appreciate. In a royal rule it is 
quite clear that the superiority and power resides in the ruler, but 
as Aristotle acknowledges a constitutional rule does not have such 
obvious distinctions. Aristotle writes:
[I]n most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled 
by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that 
the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. 
Nevertheless, when one rules and the other is ruled we endeavor 
to create a difference of outward forms and names and titles 
of respect…The relation of the male to female is always of this 
kind.238 
 
This passage indicates that the natures between men and women are 
not markedly dissimilar, but due to the conventions and traditions 
in governance, it is customary to encourage external differences 
and ways of being addressed. Aristotle writes “Again, the male is by 
nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the 
other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind.”239 
Aristotle unequivocally declares that the superior party must rule the 
inferior, but what often goes unnoticed is that Aristotle acknowledges 
the degrees of inferiority by the type of rule. Children are far inferior 
and therefore require a royal rule, but by declaring women’s rule 
constitutional, Aristotle recognizes that women are only slightly inferior 
to men. 
238 Pol.1.12.1259b4-10.
239 Pol. 1.5.1254b13-14.
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 When promoting women’s excellence of industry, Aristotle is 
vague for he promotes industry with no other clarification than that it 
not be sordid. Whatever industry Aristotle does envisage most 
certainly takes place within the home, but there are still many 
worthwhile tasks and occupations available to Athenian women in the 
domestic setting. There is also precedent for having women work in 
Classical Athenian society without any changes to the current social 
institutions. In particular, Xenophon describes a conversation between 
Socrates and Aristarchus where Aristarchus laments that due to the 
political disorder of the time, Aristarchus was forced to allow fourteen 
of his female relatives to move into his home for protection. 
Aristarchus, unable to afford the costs of maintaining them laments 
his upcoming insolvency. To help, Socrates proposes that Aristarchus’ 
relatives should be put to work. Aristarchus counters that this cannot 
be done, for women of his class are unused to working. Socrates, 
however, succeeds in convincing Aristarchus not only that honorable 
work will not demean the women but also that the women themselves 
will be far happier if they engage in productive employment.240 
Aristotle does not specifically explain the benefits of industry, but he is 
well aware that industrious women have an easier experience with 
pregnancy, and according to Xenophon at least, women are happier 
240 Pomeroy 1976, 71.
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with productive industry. If industrious work is considered a woman’s 
excellence, then we should not be surprised – as I discuss in the next 
section regarding women’s role in society - that women are meant, 
with their husbands, to significantly contribute to the home.
IV.
If one only focuses on Aristotle’s comments concerning women’s 
nature, Aristotle appears to entertain an unwarrantedly negative 
opinion of women, but if one investigates Aristotle’s conception of a 
good marriage, one comprehends that Aristotle credits women with a 
far more important and respected role in society than many 
appreciate. As stated previously, Aristotle provides his harshest 
criticism towards women in the Politics, a text where he defends the 
status quo of Classical Athens, therefore in order for him to advocate 
keeping women in their current position he seeks ways in which they 
are inferior and require governing. In other texts, however, women 
play a vital role in the family, and by extension, the state. In Book 
VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle discusses friendship, 
he writes:
Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; 
for man is naturally inclined to form couples - even more than 
to form cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more 
necessary than the city, and reproduction is more common to 
man than with the animals. With the other animals the union 
extends only to this point, but human beings live together 
not only for the sake of reproduction but also for the various 
purposes of life; for from the start the functions are divided, 
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and those of man and woman are different; so they help each 
other by throwing their peculiar gifts into the common stock. It 
is for these reasons that both utility and pleasure seem to be 
found in this kind of friendship. But this friendship may be based 
also on excellence, if the parties are good; for each has its own 
excellence and they will delight in the fact.241 
 
Admittedly, the friendship between husband and wife is not the 
highest form of friendship, but this passage recognizes that women 
are necessary for domestic happiness as well as reproduction. The 
type of marriage Aristotle describes requires that both parties exhibit 
excellences of their respective sex, so even though men and women 
have different excellences, both must be sufficiently competent to 
contribute to the family. Aristotle expects women to contribute to the 
family, if not in equal measure to the men then at least significantly. It 
seems that if women did not make a considerable contribution to the 
family Aristotle would not write that men and women help each other 
by utilizing their individual talent. Aristotle seems to argue that men 
and women have distinct functions, but each function is considerable 
and that women could not do men’s functions as well as men do, 
and men could not do women’s as well as women do. Of course, the 
reason women have distinct functions from the men is due to the fact 
that Aristotle believes they have distinct natures, but yet he does not 
belittle women’s contributions. 
241 NE 8.12.1162a15-27.
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Aristotle devotes more attention to the relationship between 
men and women in marriage in the Economics and emphasizes the 
unique bond between husband and wife. Aristotle writes:
As regards the human part of the household, the first care is 
concerning a wife; for a common life is above all things natural 
to the male and to the female. For we have elsewhere  laid down 
the principle that nature aims at producing many such forms of 
association, just as also it produces the various kinds of animals. 
But it is impossible for the female to accomplish this without the 
male or the male without the female, so that their common life 
has necessarily arisen. Now in the other animals this intercourse 
is not based on reason, but depends on the amount of natural 
instinct which they possess and is entirely for the purpose of 
procreation. But in the civilized and more intelligent animals the 
bond of unity is more complex (for in them we see more mutual 
help and goodwill and co-operation), above all in the case of 
man, because the female and the male co-operate to ensure not 
merely existence but a good life.242 
 
Aristotle believes that the partnership between men and women is not 
simply convenient or a way of replenishing the state, as Plato views 
it in the Republic and the Laws. In this text, Aristotle unequivocally 
states that the women do not make a contribution significant for a 
woman, but that there is “more mutual help” between the man and 
the woman. We also see a reassertion that the marriage relationship 
is not only natural, but that the goodwill between the two results in a 
good life. Aristotle continues:  
Thus the nature both of the man and of the woman has been 
preordained by the will of heaven to live a common life. For 
they are distinguished in that the powers which they possess 
are not applicable to purposes in all cases identical, but in some 
respects their functions are opposed to one another though 
242 Eco. 1.3.134b7-20.
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they all tend to the same end. For nature has made the one sex 
stronger, while the other weaker, that the latter through fear 
may be the more cautious, while the former by its courage is 
better able to ward off attacks; and that the one may acquire 
possessions outside the house, the other preserve those within. 
In the performance of work, she made one sex able to lead a 
sedentary life and not strong enough to endure exposure, the 
other less adapted for quiet pursuits but well constituted for 
outdoor activities; and in relation to offspring she has made both 
share in the procreation of children, but each render its peculiar 
service towards them, the woman by nurturing, the man by 
educating them.243 
 
Unlike Plato who views the soul as sexless, Aristotle believes that 
a woman’s body and a man’s body possess preordained natures, 
thereby preventing any need to investigate what a woman’s nature 
is best suited to do; one’s sex, not one’s soul, determines what one 
is most suited to do by nature. On Aristotle’s account, husband and 
wife work for a common end and this common end resembles a mean 
with the husband and wife being at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
Unlike the doctrine of the mean where traits on either side of the mean 
are flawed, Aristotle views women’s weakness and men’s strength 
as good, natural, and necessary. According to Aristotle, nature made 
women more cautious, weaker, well-suited to a sedentary life, and 
nurturing for specific reasons. It is important to recognize this point 
as some believe that, when he states that women are weaker than 
men, Aristotle is claiming that women are deficient in this respect. 
What the passage above demonstrates, however, is that women’s 
243 Eco. 1.3.1343b7-1344a8.
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nature is necessary for their role in the family and not only are women 
by nature suited to a domestic role, but that men could not perform 
women’s role as well or as contentedly. Aristotle does not keep women 
within the home because their deliberative capacity lacks authority 
or because women fall short of men in other vital ways; women have 
the role they do solely because they are best at it and their success is 
due to their having the natures they do. Aristotle, then, does not view 
women as deficient men or as somehow lacking, but as ideally suited 
by nature to perform the tasks at which they excel and men do not. 
In the Politics, Aristotle criticizes women’s akuron deliberative 
capacity, but passages from the Economics portray women as not only 
capable of running the home without their husband’s supervision, but 
that the husband is blameworthy if there is a lack of affection in the 
marriage. Aristotle writes that a husband:
[m]ust not do her any wrong; for thus a man is less likely 
himself to be wronged. This is inculcated by the general law, as 
the Pythagoreans say, that one least of all should injure a wife 
as being ‘a suppliant and taken from her hearth’. Now wrong 
inflicted by a husband is the formation of connexions outside his 
own house. As regards association, she ought not to need him 
when he is present or be incapacitated in his absence, but should 
be accustomed to be competent whether he is present or not.244 
 
This passage implies that it is in a husband’s interest to treat his wife 
well and not view her as “a suppliant and taken from her hearth.” 
What is more telling, though, is the statement that a wife should not 
244 Eco 1.4.1344a9-15.
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need her husband’s presence or aid to perform her role as mistress 
of the home; in order for this statement to be true women require 
intelligence and practical capacities in order to run the home without 
requiring supervision. Aristotle continues to write:
The saying of Hesiod is a good one:
A man should marry a maiden, that habits discreet he may teach 
her.245
For dissimilarity of habits tends more than anything to destroy 
affection. As regards adornment, husband and wife ought not 
to approach one another with false affection in their person any 
more than in their manners; for if society of husband and wife 
requires such embellishment, it is no better than play-acting on 
the tragic stage.246
 
Aristotle, unlike Plato, sees marriage not only as a necessary and 
natural social institution but one based on more than procreation. 
When Plato discusses marriage in the Laws there is little mention of 
the relationship of married couples besides those relating to producing 
children. Though Plato does provide provisions for divorce if a couple is 
incompatible, he does not emphasize genuine affection in marriage. It 
is of course possible that Plato assumes that the couples will come to 
have affection for each other by living their lives together and raising 
children, but Aristotle appears to place more value on the emotions 
between husband and wife. From the passage above, Aristotle gives 
the husband the responsibility to in some manner form his wife, and 
if we remember that brides could be as young as fourteen, they likely 
245 Works and Days, 699.
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did require maturing and development. Aristotle recognizes not all 
couples are so fortunate, but he clearly considers genuine fondness to 
be the goal, if not the norm, in marriage.
V.
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of Aristotle’s conception of 
women’s nature and their resulting role in society is its cohesiveness. 
The same in fact can be said of Aristotle’s entire conception of 
peoples’ natures and their appropriate role, for every nature has a 
perfectly corresponding role in the state. On Aristotle’s account every 
category of person is specifically designed by nature to occupy a 
certain role and as a result there is no need for any radical change. 
More importantly, however, everyone is happy in their role and there 
is a sense of order and continuity. Another result, however, is that by 
assuming Classical Athenian society is a reflection of what is natural, 
women cannot be judged by the merit of their soul or their potential. 
Women are not the only category not to have an opportunity for a 
different role in society, as slaves are also deemed to be slaves by 
nature. Aristotle does not explain women’s ideal role in society 
exactly, though it is clear that it is extremely similar to the role of 
contemporary Athenian women. What is clear is that women’s nature 
makes their ideal role in society to be within the domestic sphere, and 
since their inherent nature cannot be changed, this is the only 
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appropriate role for women.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion
 
 
 
To conclude, I have demonstrated that women play a vital role 
in Plato’s and Aristotle’s states. Plato is philosophically committed to 
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only judge people by their nature entailing that there is no such thing 
as an ideal role for women as such in his state; instead, a person 
should pursue that which he is meant to do by nature. On Plato’s 
account, the main distinction between men and women is that women 
give birth, but since he views childbirth as a purely biological process 
that does not affect one’s capacity to reason or one’s soul, women 
cannot be barred from any profession based on sex alone. Aristotle, 
while believing that men and women have distinct natures, sees the 
differences between men and women as complimentary rather than in 
terms of better and worse. Women are not as brave or intelligent, but 
they have their own unique virtues that are equally necessary to the 
welfare of the family. Plato and Aristotle did not support modern 
notions of women’s equality, but as shown this does not mean women 
did not occupy crucial roles in their societies. 
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